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5.  Purpose:
 This document represents a summary version of the criticality analysis done to support loading SNF 
in a Type 1a basket/standard canister combination. Specifically, this engineering design file (EDF) 
captures the information pertinent to the intact condition of four fuel types with different fissile loads and 
their calculated reactivities. These fuels are then degraded into various configurations inside a canister 
without the presence of significant moderation. The important aspect of this study is the portrayal of the 
fuel degradation and its effect on the reactivity of a single canister given the supposition there will be 
continued moderation exclusion from the canister. Subsequent analyses also investigate the most reactive 
‘dry’ canister in a nine canister array inside a hypothetical transport cask, both dry and partial to 
complete flooding inside the transport cask. The analyses also includes a comparison of the most reactive 
configuration to other benchmarked fuels using a software package called TSUNAMI, which is part of 
the SCALE 5.0 suite of software. 
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ACRONYMS
AENCF  average energy (of) neutrons causing fission 
ASME  American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
ASTM  American Society for Testing and Materials 
ATR  Advanced Test Reactor 
BFS  big physical stand 
BOL  beginning of life 
BSC  Bechtel SAIC, LLC 
CRWMS  Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System  
DOE  U.S. Department of Energy 
DOE/RW  DOE Office of Radioactive Waste 
DWG  drawing (document type) 
EDF  engineering design file 
ENDF  evaluated nuclear data file 
FHU  fuel-handling unit 
HEU  highly enriched uranium 
HP  Hewlett-Packard 
H/X  hydrogen to fissile ratio 
ICSBE  International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments 
INEEL  Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 
INL  Idaho National Laboratory 
IPPE  Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (Russia) 
keff  Effective neutron multiplication factor 
M&O  management and operations 
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MCNP  Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code 
MEU  medium-enriched uranium 
MIT  Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MURR  Missouri University Research Reactor 
NSNFP  National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program 
OCRWM  Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management 
ORR   Oak Ridge Research Reactor 
PC  personal computer 
SCM  software configuration management 
SNF  Spent Nuclear Fuel 
UAlx   uranium aluminide 
UNS  Unified Numbering System 
YMP  Yucca Mountain Project 
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1. PURPOSE 
The objective of these analyses are to demonstrate that DOE SNF canisters loaded for disposal in 
the national repository with Type 1a baskets can also meet criticality safety under transportation scenarios 
prescribed by 10CFR71.55.  Several DOE SNFs (Appendix B) show which SNFs will be packaged using 
a Type 1a basket configuration.  Of these SNFs, the following four fuel types were considered among the 
most reactive, either because of their individual fissile loads (per assembly) or what their collective fissile 
content contributes to a loaded canister: 
x Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) 
x Oak Ridge Research Reactor (ORR) 
x Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) 
x Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). 
These four fuel types are evaluated to identify the parameters they represent in terms of criticality 
safety for a loaded SNF canister, e.g. total fissile, enrichment, and linear fissile loading in a canister. The 
analyses demonstrate the technical viability of the DOE Standardized SNF canister and associated 
packaging for addressing transportation issues relative to criticality safety. 
The preliminary analyses provide a baseline comparison between the individual fuel types for their 
proposed loading in single DOE SNF canisters. Analyses address reconfigured fuel (i.e. fuel debris) in 
both horizontal and vertical orientations of the canister and the debris contained within each basket 
compartment. Special cases also analyze bounding configurations in which the fuel debris from stacked 
baskets is consolidated within one set of basket compartments, meaning basket base plates do not keep 
the fuel debris from consolidating in one lumped mass. Special cases also examine a non-mechanistic 
case in which fissile material is consolidated in the bottom of the canister and away from any poisoned 
basket plates. The remaining analyses examine the transport cask cavity relative to an array of canisters  
with their content in their most reactive configuration and subject to various degrees of flooding. 
2. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
This document was developed and is controlled in accordance with NSNFP procedures. Unless 
noted otherwise, information must be evaluated for adequacy relative to its specific use if relied on to 
support design or decisions important to safety or waste isolation. 
The NSNFP procedures applied to this activity implement DOE/RW-0333P, Quality Assurance 
Requirements and Description [DOE 2004a], and are part of the NSNFP Quality Assurance Program. The 
NSNFP Quality Assurance Program has been assessed and accepted by representatives of the Office of 
Quality Assurance within the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management for the work scope of 
the NSNFP. The NSNFP work scope extends to the work represented in this report. 
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The current, principal NSNFP procedures applied to this activity include the following: 
x NSNFP 3.03, “Engineering Analysis” 
x NSNFP Procedure 3.04, “Engineering Documentation” 
x NSNFP Procedure 6.01, “Review and Approval of NSNFP Internal Documents” 
x NSNFP Procedure 6.03, “Managing Document Control and Distribution”.  
2.1 METHOD 
The method to perform the criticality calculations consists of using the Monte Carlo N-Particle 
Transport Code (MCNP) Version 4B2 [CRWMS 1998a, 1998b] to calculate the effective neutron 
multiplication factor of the waste package. The calculations are performed using the continuous-energy, 
cross-section libraries, which are part of the qualified code system MCNP 4B2 [CRWMS 1998a, 1998b].  
3. ASSUMPTIONS 
3.1 Neutron Interaction Cross Sections for 137Ba
Assumption: 138Ba cross sections are assumed to adequately represent 137Ba cross sections in the 
MCNP input.. 
Rationale: The cross sections of 137Ba are not available in either evaluated nuclear data file 
ENDF/B-V or ENDF/B-VI cross-section libraries  
Confirmation Status: This assumption is conservative, because the thermal neutron capture cross 
section and the resonance integral of 137Ba (5.1 and 4 barn, respectively) are greater than the thermal 
neutron capture cross section and the resonance integral of 138Ba (0.43 and 0.3 barn, respectively) 
[Parrington et al. 1996, p. 34] and thus does not require further confirmation. 
Use in the Calculation: This assumption is used in the analyses used to produce the results given in 
Section 7. 
3.2 Neutron Interaction Cross Sections for Zinc 
Assumption: Al cross sections are assumed to adequately represent zinc cross sections in the MCNP 
input.
Rationale: The cross sections of zinc are not available in the MCNP 4B2LV cross-section libraries. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption is conservative because the thermal neutron capture cross 
section and the resonance integral of zinc [Parrington et al., 1996, p. 24] are greater than the thermal neutron 
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capture cross section and the resonance integral of Al [Parrington et al., 1996, p. 21] and thus  does not 
require further confirmation. 
Use in the Calculation: This assumption is used in the analyses used to produce the results given in 
Section 7. 
3.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Composition 
Assumption: Beginning-of-life composition is conservatively assumed in the calculations, and no 
credit is taken for the initial boron neutron absorber present in the fuel. 
Rationale: This assumption is conservative, because it results in a higher keff for the system. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require further confirmation. 
Use in the Calculation: This assumption is used in the analyses used to produce the results given in 
Section 7. 
3.4 Fissile Content  
Assumption: Because the fuels analyzed are manufactured with various BOL fissile loadings, the 
highest fissile content is conservatively assumed. 
Rationale: This assumption is conservative, because it maximizes the fissile isotope (235U) content 
while minimizing the effect of neutron absorption by 238U.
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require further confirmation. 
Use in the Calculation: This assumption is used in the analyses used to produce the results given in 
Section 7. 
3.5 Moderator Saturation of Fissile Matrix Material 
Assumption: Voids within the fuel matrix are assumed to have the following values and 
conservatively assumed to be completely waterlogged.   
x ATR   11%  (resultant H/X ratio of ~2.1;  89.18 g H20/assembly) 
x MURR   11%  (resultant H/X ratio of ~2.0;  58.94 g H20/assembly) 
x MIT   19.75% (resultant H/X ratio of ~3.4;  70.04 g H20/assembly) 
x ORR   ~30%  (resultant H/X ratio of ~8.8; 116.83 g H20/assembly) 
Rationale: Fuel matrix materials have a production density that is less than theoretical density for the 
given composition [Knight, pg. 21, Fig. 17] and/or may have undergone fracturing due to radiation 
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exposure.  Water may have become entrained in the fuel matrix interstices during time of immersion in 
reactor operations and/or wet pool storage because of cladding defects.  It is not likely that any fuel drying 
process will be able to remove this trapped water if present. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption is conservative because the assumed water promotes thermal 
neutron behavior, and because not all of the fuel matrix interstices are water saturated due to drying and the 
fact that they may not be interconnected. This assumption does not require further confirmation. 
Use in the Calculation: This assumption is used in the analyses used to produce the results given in 
Section 7. 
4. USE OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
4.1 Software 
Microsoft EXCEL Version 2003 Service Pack-2, was used for performing tabular representations 
and arithmetical manipulations in a spreadsheet environment. KaleidaGraph Version 4.03 was used to 
create the X-Y plots associated with the tabular data presented in the various sections of this report.  
These two commercial software packages were installed on a personal computer (PC) Dell Optiplex 
GX270 operating under Microsoft Windows XP operating system and are exempt from software QA and 
CM requirements in accordance with NSNFP 19.01, Software Control.   
4.1.1 MCNP 
The MCNP code [CRWMS 1998b] is used to calculate the keff of the waste package. The software 
specifications are as follows: 
x Status: Qualified 
x Software name: MCNP 
x Software version/revision number: Version 4B2 
x Software tracking number (computer software configuration item): 30033 V4B2LV 
x Computer type: Hewlett-Packard (HP) 9000 Series workstations 
x Operating system: HP-UX 10.20 and 11.00 
x Computer processing unit number: Software is installed on the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) 
workstation ‘homer’, with property number 352667. 
The MCNP software used is (a) appropriate for the application of keff calculations, (b) used only 
within the range of validation as documented in Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System 
management and operations [CRWMS 1998a] and Briesmeister [1997], and (c) obtained from the 
Software Configuration Management in accordance with LP-SI.11 Q-BSC.
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4.1.2 SCALE 5.0 
At the time the calculations were performed using  KENO V.a/TSUNAMI code from SCALE 5.0, 
it was recognized that the code had not been validated and verified at the INL for these scoping 
calculations. The INL subsequently qualified SCALE 5.0 [SQAP] and evaluated the impacts on this work. 
Because no changes occurred to the SCALE software, e.g. ‘patches’ or revisions as a result of the 
validation and qualification process, the NSNFP concluded that the TSUNAMI cases reported in this EDF 
are valid. However, the initial model analyses were processed on the PC compatible version of SCALE 
5.0. Subsequent case verifications reran the models on Sun workstations after the SCALE 5.0 software 
qualification efforts for those computers were completed. 
5. Description of Canister and Canister Contents 
The canister configurations analyzed will contain either two or three Type 1a baskets containing 
ATR, MURR, MIT, or ORR SNF.  Section 6.1 describes the canister.  The Type 1a basket is described in 
Section 6.2, and each of the four fuel types are described in section 6.3.  
Fuel packaging is based on fissile content proposed for repository disposal under fully 
degraded/moderated conditions in a post-closure scenario that is much more severe than those expected 
for loading, storage, or transportation. [Ref. CRWMS 2004] Gd poisoning in the basket material is 
installed to address these post-closure repository scenarios. 
5.1 DOE Standardized SNF Canister 
The conceptual design for the 18” standardized DOE SNF canister is taken from DOE [1999, p. 5 and 
A-2]. The DOE SNF canister is a right circular cylinder made from stainless steel pipe (Type 316L, Unified 
Numbering System [UNS] S31603) with an outside diameter of 18 in. (457.2 mm) and a wall thickness of 
0.375 in. (9.525 mm). The minimum internal length of the short canister is 100 in. (2,540.0 mm), and the 
nominal overall length is 10 ft (approximately 3,000.0 mm). There is a curved carbon steel (American 
Society for Testing and Materials [ASTM] A 516 Grade 70) impact plate, 50.8 mm (2.0 in.) thick, at the top 
and bottom boundaries of the canister. Dished heads seal the ends of the DOE SNF canister. The maximum 
loaded mass is 2,270 kg for the short canister [DOE 1999, Table 3.2]. A sketch of the canister is shown in 
Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1. Plan view of a typical DOE standardized SNF canister. 
At the present time, use of the Type 1a basket is intended for use only in the 18-in. diameter 
canister. Stacking of baskets within a canister will be dictated by the individual fuel lengths and thereby 
determine the use of 10-ft. or 15-ft long canisters. 
5.2 Type 1a Basket 
The DOE SNF canister typically contains a basket structure to hold the spent fuel. The basket is not a 
part of the DOE SNF canister. The basket structure provides material for controlling criticality, provides 
structural support, and acts as a guide for assemblies during loading. The basket structure to be used for 
packaging ATR SNF is designated as a Type 1a basket and is shown in Figures 6.2-1 and 6.2-2.  Its length is 
specified to accommodate the length of the specific fuel to be loaded.   The basket compartment dividers are 
made of low-C-Ni-Cr-Mo-Gd alloy (UNS N06464) with a Gd content of 2.0 wt% [DOE 2004b, pp. 53–55]. 
The basket structure contains two axial identical sections (layers) each with a circular base plate.   The 
length of each ATR basket is 51-3/4 in. (1,341.45 mm). All Gd alloy plates and the 304L base plate used a 
thickness of 0.375 in. (9.525 mm). A cross-sectional view is shown in Figure 6.2-1 [DOE 2004b, p. 53]. The 
basket grid structure is surrounded by a type 304L stainless steel sleeve with an outer diameter of 16.90 
in. (429.26 mm) and a thickness of 0.0625 in. (1.587 mm).  The Type 1a basket contains 10 
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compartments.  The basket compartments are defined by horizontal and vertical plates as shown in 
Figures 6.2-1 and 6.2.-2. 
Baskets will be stacked on one another in the canister (see Figure 6.3-1). Canisters will then be 
seal-welded per American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Division 3 code qualifications. A 
similar approach will be taken with other fuels in terms of loading in a Type 1a basket. In the case of the 
shorter fuels, such as the MURR, MIT, and ORR fuels, the basket length will be commensurately shorter 
but will also be stacked three-high inside an 18-in. diameter, 10-ft long SNF canister. 
Figure 6.2-1. Cross-sectional schematic of the Type 1a basket structure and sleeve. 
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Figure 6.2-2. Type 1a SNF basket (for ATR SNF) 
5.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) SNF inventory is comprised of more than 250 types of 
fuels with differing shapes, fuel matrix compositions, fissile isotopes, cladding, and enrichments. In order 
to streamline the criticality analyses needed to qualify these fuels for acceptance into the national 
repository, the fuels were grouped by the primary common parameter of the fuel matrix material and the 
secondary parameter of enrichment. Packaging concepts were developed to satisfy handling requirements 
in the surface facility (including drop accidents) and post-closure repository conditions that included 
criticality analyses for waste package breaches. Eventually, the criticality analyses evolved into 
development of a limited number of generic basket designs, each capable of accommodating a variety of 
fuels based on their physical size. Regardless of the fuel type, the canister loadings, and any included 
poisons, are predicated on remaining below the subcritical limit for a degraded canister inside a flooded 
waste package in a horizontal orientation within the repository. 
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In the case of the fuel grouping that will be packaged into a canister using a Type 1a basket, four 
fuels were selected for these criticality analyses based on their fissile content and linear loading.  The 
intent was to identify the bounding criticality analyses for these four fuel types as the basis for 
demonstrating criticality safety under prescribed transportation scenarios. The analyses would also 
identify any controls that may be necessary during canister loading to ensure that these analyses bound all 
loaded configurations. Prior to loading, all the different and disparate fuels identified for loading in a 
Type 1a basket will have to undergo their own criticality safety evaluation (CSE) based on their as-loaded 
condition, both dry and flooded. Specific parameters such as total fissile, linear fissile loading, calculated 
keff , and thermal output will have to demonstrate lesser values than those of the as-loaded, baseline ATR 
fuel.
A summary of the fuel loadings for these four fuels in a standardized SNF canister is shown in 
Table 6.3-1. 
Table 6.3-1. Aluminum plate-fuel comparisons. 
Fuel identifier Æ
ATR
(HEU/ 
UAlx)
[10’ 
canister] 
ATR
(HEU/ 
UAlx) [15’ 
canister] 
ORR
(MEU/ 
U-Al-Si) 
ORR (HEU 
/U3O8)
MIT (HEU/ 
UAlx)
MURR
(HEU/ 
UAlx)
BOL % enrichment 93.15 93.15 20.56 93.15 93.15 93.15 
Assemblies/canister 20 30 30 30 30 24 
Fissile/assembly (kg) 1.085 1.085 0.347 0.300 0.525 0.783 
Fissile/canister (kg) 21.70 32.55 10.41 9.00 15.75 18.79 
Canister fissile linear 
loading (g/cm) 
78.619 78.619 41.001 35.447 62.003 73.990 
‘Homogenized’ fissile 
atom-density/ canister 
(atom/b-cm) 
1.45E-04 1.45E-04 6.79E-05 6.02E-05 1.05E-04 1.26E-04 
5.3.1 Advance Test Reactor Fuel 
The ATR fuel assemblies will be inserted in each one of 10 compartments in a Type 1a basket, and 
the baskets will be stacked three high in a 15’ canister. Previous criticality analyses had examined ATR 
assemblies ‘two-stacked’ in a 10-ft. canister when their cropped length was quoted as <49.5-in. (1257.3 
mm). Subsequent information [FRC-0022] revealed a longer assembly length was possible, thereby 
necessitating longer baskets stacked three-deep in a 15-ft. canister. This resulted in an attendant 50% 
increase in the fissile load per canister, but no change in the linear fissile load. The ‘three-stack’ analyses 
examined the fuel assemblies as though they met the earlier maximum dimension of 49.5-in.; this 
represents the more conservative (most reactive) case with respect to neutron interaction between 
assemblies. 
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Figure 6.3-1. Conceptual canister.  
A typical ATR fuel element consists of 19 curved Al-clad uranium aluminide (UAlx) plates 
containing highly enriched uranium (HEU) (93 ± 1 wt% 235U) [Reed et al. 1992]. The nominal fissile 
loading (235U) of the fresh fuel element is 1,075 g [Paige 1969]. The allowable uncertainty in the fuel 
loading is 1% or 10.75 g [INEEL 2003]. The highest fissile loading of 1,085.75 g was conservatively used 
in the present analysis. 
Figure 6.3-2 presents a simplified view of a typical ATR fuel element. The fuel elements are 
cropped to the length of the fuel plates by removing the upper and lower end boxes. The fuel plates are 
49.5 in. (1,257.3 mm) long with a fuel zone that is 48.76 in. (1,238.504 mm) long. The cropped length of 
a fuel assembly can range from 49.5 in.(1,257,30 mm) up to 51.0 in (1,295.40 mm). [FRC-0022]  
The following data are characteristics for the ATR 7F fuel elements [Paige 1969]. The thickness of 
each plate is 0.05 in. (1.27 mm) except plates 1 and 19, which are 0.08 in. (2.03 mm) and 0.1 in. 
(2.54 mm), respectively. The fuel matrix section in each plate is 0.02 in. (0.51 mm) thick. The cladding is 
made of aluminum (T-6061). The plates are held in place by aluminum side plates that are 2.55 in. 
(64.77 mm) wide (radial thickness of the fuel assembly), 0.187 in. (4.75 mm) thick, and 49.5 in. 
(1,257.3 mm) long. When assembled, the angle of curvature of the fuel elements is 45º with an inner 
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radius of 2.964 in. (75.29 mm) and an outer radius of 5.513 in. (140.03 mm). The detailed dimensions of 
each fuel plate and fuel matrix are presented in Table 6.1-1.  
Analysis of the ATR fuels is based on the compositions provided for the ATR-7F elements from 
contract C-285, which requires 1,075 g 235U nominal and 1,085.75 g 235U [max] loading. The uranium 
loading varies by fuel plate by the following amounts:  
x Plates 1, 2, 18, and 19 at 32.5 to 33.5 wt% U 
x Plates 3, 4, 16, and 17 at 38.1 to 38.8 wt% U 
x Plates 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 at 44.4 to 44.6 wt% U 
x Plates 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 at 44.8 to 45.2 wt% U.  
Element weight is comprised of type 6061 Al side plates (1.17 kg), type 6061 Al (0.6 wt% Si) clad 
and type 1100 Al (0.1 wt% Si) frame (4.42 kg), and fuel matrix (3.02 kg) for a total assembly weight of 
8.61 kg. The density of the T6061 Al side plate is 2.7 g/cm3.
NATIONAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL PROGRAM ENGINEERING DESIGN FILE
EDF-NSNF-068
  Revision 0
   Page 19 of 84
 Title: Criticality Analysis for Proposed Maximum Fuel Loading in a Standardized SNF Canister with Type 
1a Baskets 
Figure 6.3-2. Simplified view of the ATR fuel element. 
Table 6.3-2. Dimensions and fissile loading for individual plates in ATR fuel element. 
Plate Number 
Inner Radius 
(mm) 
Outer Radius 
(mm) 
Plate Arc 
Length
(mm) 
Fuel Meat Arc 
Length
(mm) 
235U content, 
gms (max) 
1 76.5810 78.6130 54.1020 41.3258 24.543 
2 80.5942 81.8642 55.4228 49.2506 29.391 
3 83.8454 85.1154 57.9882 51.8160 39.087 
4 87.0966 88.3666 60.5028 54.3306 40.804 
5 90.3478 91.6178 63.0936 56.9214 52.621 
6 93.5990 94.8690 65.6336 59.4614 55.146 
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Plate Number 
Inner Radius 
(mm) 
Outer Radius 
(mm) 
Plate Arc 
Length
(mm) 
Fuel Meat Arc 
Length
(mm) 
235U content, 
gms (max) 
7 96.8502 98.1202 68.1990 62.0268 57.570 
8 100.1014 101.3714 70.7390 64.5668 59.994 
9 103.3526 104.6226 73.3044 67.1322 62.418 
10 106.6038 107.8738 75.8444 69.6722 64.842 
11 109.8550 111.1250 78.4098 72.2376 67.266 
12 113.1062 114.3762 80.9752 74.8030 69.690 
13 116.3574 117.6274 83.5152 77.3430 72.114 
14 119.6086 120.8786 86.0806 79.9084 74.538 
15 122.8598 124.1298 88.6206 82.4484 77.063 
16 126.1110 127.3810 91.1860 85.0138 64.640 
17 129.3622 130.6322 93.7260 87.5538 66.559 
18 132.6134 133.8834 96.2914 88.8492 54.338 
19 135.8646 138.4046 100.8634 88.0872 53.126 
Total 235U:           1085.75 gms   
Source: Paige (1969), ATR 7F fuel element 
5.3.2 Missouri University Research Reactor Fuel 
The details of the MURR fuel were obtained from the MURR fuel specification [DWG 237]. The 
MURR fuel assembly is constructed from 24 fuel plates, two side plates, two combs, and several smaller 
pieces of hardware (screws, nuts, pins, and rivets). The fuel plates are attached to the fuel sections by 
riveting. Combs are attached to the fuel plates by pinning. 
The overall length of a new fuel assembly is 32.5 in. (825.50 mm) [DWG 409] [CRWMS 1997a] 
with a cropped length of approximately 26.5 in. (673.10 mm) [OBU 2003] after removing the top and 
bottom ends of the assembly, which do not contain uranium materials. Figure 6.3-3 depicts a simplified 
view for both length and cross section of a cropped fuel element. 
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Figure 6.3-3. Simplified view of the MURR fuel element (cropped length). 
The fueled portion of each plate can range from 23.25 to 24.75 in. (590.55 to 628.65 mm) 
[DWG 409]. The fuel matrix alloy is 0.020 in. (0.51 mm) thick, with an aluminum cladding thickness of 
0.015 in. (0.38 mm), for total plate thicknesses of 0.050 in. (1.27 mm) [DWG 237]. 
The width of the individual plates is variable between 1.9929 to 4.3421 in. (50.62 to 110.29 mm), 
because the fuel element employs 45º wedge shaped construction with curved plates using an outer radius 
of 5.885 in. (149.48 mm) and an inner radius of 2.675 in. (67.95 mm) [OBU 2003]. 
Density of the aluminum used for the fuel plate cladding is 2.7 g/cm 3 [CRWMS 1997a]. Table 6.3-
3 provides the fissile loading for each plate (element) in the assembly. This fuel matrix material consists 
of 93 + 1.0% enriched U as a UAlx powder which is in turn dispersed in Al powder and sintered together.
Density of this Al powder used in the fuel matrix is 2.7 g/cm3 [CRWMS 1997a] and density of the UAlx
matrix is 6.4 g/cm3 [Knight 1993]. 
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Table 6.3-3. MURR fuel assembly plate details. 
Plate/
Element No. 
UAlx, Wt. 
(g) +3% 
Al Matrix Wt. (g) 
[excluding Al 
in UAlx] +3%
Al Clad Wt 
(g) +5% 
235U Content 
(g) +1% 
1 29.0 21.0 80.0 19.260 
2 30.9 22.0 86.0 20.393 
3 32.7 23.3 89.0 21.526 
4 34.6 24.9 93.0 22.659 
5 36.2 26.3 100.0 23.793 
6 37.9 27.5 106.0 24.926 
7 39.5 28.8 108.0 26.059 
8 41.2 29.7 113.0 27.192 
9 43.0 31.4 116.0 28.325 
10 44.6 32.8 120.0 29.459 
11 46.6 33.9 123.0 30.592 
12 48.1 35.3 128.0 31.725 
13 49.9 36.6 131.0 32.858 
14 51.5 38.0 131.0 33.992 
15 53.3 38.6 136.0 35.125 
16 55.0 40.5 138.0 36.258 
17 56.8 41.0 138.0 37.391 
18 58.5 42.3 140.0 38.524 
19 60.2 43.5 143.0 39.658 
20 61.9 44.8 147.0 40.791 
21 63.6 46.0 150.0 41.924 
22 65.6 47.3 154.0 43.057 
23 67.3 48.5 170.0 44.191 
24 69.0 49.7 172.0 45.324 
Totals 1176.9 853.7 3012.0 775.0 
5.3.3 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Fuel 
The details of the MIT fuel were obtained from CRWMS [1997b]. The MIT SNF plate/assembly 
drawing is found in drawing (DWG) 419486 [DWG 419]. The MIT fuel assembly is constructed from 
15 flat plates tilted at a 60º angle so that the resulting assembly has a rhomboidal (equilateral 
parallelogram with 60º acute angles) cross section, instead of the more common square or partial-arc 
cross section. Figure 6.3-4 depicts the MIT fuel assembly. The MIT fuel length values used in these 
analyses are shorter than the original as-built length of the MIT assembly, because the top and bottom 
ends of the assembly, which do not contain uranium materials, have been removed by cutting. 
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The flat plates are 2.552 +0.000, -0.002 in. (64.82 +0.0, -0.05 mm) wide and 23 in. 
(584.20 mm) long. All 15 plates are the same and have a finned cladding surface with a total thickness of 
0.80 + 0.003 in. (20.32 + 0.08 mm) including a fin height of 0.010 + 0.002 in. (0.25 + 0.05 mm) on both 
faces. The fuel alloy is 0.030 +0.000, -0.002 in. (0.76 +0.0, -0.05 mm) thick, 2.177 +0.000, -0.1875 in. 
(55.30 +0.0, - 4.76 mm) wide, and 23.75 + 0.233 in. (603.25 + 5.92 mm) long [DWG 419]. 
Figure 6.3-4. Simplified view of the MIT fuel element (cropped length). 
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The aluminum outer shroud that encloses the 15 fuel plates on 4 sides is a 2.405 in. (61.09 mm) 
outside dimension rhomboid with a 0.044 in. (1.12 mm) thick wall parallel with the fuel plates and a 
0.188 in. (4.78 mm) thick comb plate at 60˚ to the fuel plates, and a nominal length (after cutting) of 
23.368 in. (593.55 mm). The fuel plates are centered within this rhomboid angled 60˚ off the comb plate. 
The plates are fixed relative to each other by comb plates along two sides and the lip of the end fittings 
across the top and bottom. Drawing 419486 [DWG 419] shows a fuel plate center-to-center spacing of 
0.158 in. (4.01 mm), which is the spacing of the notches on the comb plates [CRWMS 1997b]. 
The fuel plates consist of an aluminum cladding over UAlx alloy. The maximum fuel mass for the 
MIT assembly is 514.25 g of 235U with an enrichment of 93.5 wt%, and 1 wt% of U234. The fissile atom-
densities are not tabulated in this case, as all the fissile material is uniformly distributed over each plate in 
the assembly. The Al present in the UAlx alloy is 30.5 wt%. The UAlx alloy has a significant void volume 
if distributed over the maximum dimensions of the assembly, and thus can become waterlogged with a 
resultant increase in reactivity. The maximum void volume fraction in the fuel assembly, including space 
between the plates, is 0.6353 [CRWMS 1997b]. 
5.3.4 Oak Ridge Research Reactor Fuel 
Details for the construction of the ORR fuel element are contained in drawings [OR-001], [OR-
003], and [OR-004]; a simplified depiction of a fuel assembly appears in Figure 6.3-5. The element is 
constructed from 19 curved fuel plates that are held within two opposing aluminum comb plates. The 
ORR fuel length values used in these analyses are shorter than the original as-built length of the ORR 
assembly, because the top and bottom ends of the assembly, which do not contain uranium materials, 
have been removed by cutting. The ORR fuel description [CRWMS 1997b] contains the material 
information. The maximum fuel mass used for the ORR analysis is 347 g (see clarification following 
Table 6.3-4) of 235U at an enrichment of 20.56 wt%. The uranium present in the U-Si-Al alloy is 77.5 
wt%. There are two atoms of Si per three atoms of U, and Al completes the bulk of the fuel material. The 
U-Si-Al has a significant void volume if distributed over the assembly dimensions; the maximum void 
volume fraction in the assembly (including plate spacing) is 0.4064 [CRWMS 1997b]. 
The curved plates are. 2.776 +/- .01 in. (70.32 +/- .07 mm) maximum wide with a 5.5 in. (139.70 
mm) inner radius of curvature. Seventeen of the plates comprise the inner plates, with a thickness of 
0.0494 to 0.0510 in. (1.25 to 1.30 mm) and a 0.0105 in. (0.27 mm) minimum aluminum cladding on both 
sides of a 0.020 in. (0.51 mm) nominal fuel foil. A plate tolerance of 0.005 in. (0.13 mm) is the default 
value shown on the drawing. The two outer plates have a thickness of 0.063 to 0.066 in. (1.60 to 1.68 
mm) with a 0.018 in. (0.46 mm) minimum cladding on both sides of a 0.020 in. (0.51 mm) nominal fuel 
foil. The inner and outer fuel plates are manufactured as flat laminated sheets with a 2.7925 in. (70.93 
mm) minimum and 2.7955 in. (71.01 mm) maximum width that are formed to the 5.5 in. (139.70 mm) 
radius curvature. The fuel foil is not as wide as the aluminum cladding, and an aluminum strip is used to 
close each side of the finished fuel plate. For the inner fuel plates, the width of the fuel foil allows a 0.126 
to 0.200 in. (3.20 to 5.08 mm) inset from the edge of the plate on both sides. The overall length of the 
outer plate is 27.120 to 27.130 in. (688.85 to 689.10 mm), and the fuel foil is centered within the plate 
longitudinally, with an inset at each end of 1.574 to 2.011 in. (39.98 to 51.08 mm). The top and bottom 
ends of the inner and outer fuel foils are chamfered, but this trimming of the fuel material was neglected 
[CRWMS 1997b]. 
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The aluminum comb plates enclose the 19 fuel plates on two sides, creating an approximate 3.25 
in. (82.55 mm) by 3.00 in. (76.20 mm) outside dimension rectangle and a nominal length (after cutting) of 
27.125 in. (688.98 mm). The fuel plates are centered within this box and form a square fuel/water region 
with a 3.169 in. (80.49 mm) reference dimension (the longitudinal comb plate width). The plates are fixed 
relative to each other by comb plates along two sides and by a comb strap across the top and bottom. 
Drawing M-11495-OR-003, “Misc. Details for ORR Fuel Element”, shows a fuel plate edge-to-edge 
spacing of 0.166 in. (4.22 mm), which is the spacing of the notches on the comb plates [CRWMS 1997b]. 
Figure 6.3-5. Simplified view of the ORR fuel element. 
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The ORR fuel Appendix A [OBU 2003] contains the material information associated with these 
fuels. The ORR fuel is an example of the variability that can exist across a fuel group. A summary of 
these variables (plate count per assembly, matrix composition, or enrichment) is reflected in Table 6.3-4 
[OBU 2003].  
Table 6.3-4. Variability in ORR fuel types. 
*BOL (per plate) BOL (per assembly) 
No. Type 
235U
(g)
Total U 
(g)
Enrichment
(%)
Plates
(#)
235U
(g)
Total U 
(g)
1 19 plate U3O8 MEU** 17.9 90.63 19.75% 19 340 1721.5 
2 19 plate U3O8 HEU*** 15 16.13 92.99% 19 285 306.47 
3 15 plate U3O8 HEU 11.13 11.97 92.98% 15 166.95 179.55 
4 19 plate UAlx HEU 21.85 48.65 44.91% 19 415.15 924.35 
5 13 plate UAlx MEU 24 121.21 19.80% 13 312 1575.73 
6 13 plate U3O8 MEU 26.17 133.38 19.62% 13 340.21 1733.94 
7 19 plate U3Si2 MEU 17.89 90.58 19.75% 19 339.91 1721.02 
8 17 plate U3Si2 MEU 17.89 90.58 19.75% 17 304.13 1539.86 
9 15 plate U3Si2 MEU 13.33 67.49 19.75% 15 199.95 1012.35 
10 11 plate U3Si2 MEU 18 90.9 19.80% 11 198 999.9 
*BOL = beginning of life 
** MEU = medium-enriched uranium, which ranges from >5% and <20% enrichment 
***HEU = highly enriched uranium (usually refers to fuel containing at least 93% 235U). 
The analyses done for the ORR fuels used two different fuels from this list in Table 6-17 (No. 2 
and No. 6). Fuel No. 2 lists a 235U content of 285 g assembly with a fissile enrichment of 92.99%. The 
analysis applied an increased fissile loading of 300 g 235U per assembly at the same enrichment; use of 
this fuel in the analysis will be denoted as ORR HEU. Fuel No. 6 used 347 g 235U rather than the listed 
340.21 g with its 19.62% enrichment; use of this fuel in the analysis will be denoted as ORR 
medium-enriched uranium (MEU). Where all of these fuels were irradiated in the same reactor using the 
same control rods, reactivity should be considered relatively consistent between assembly types. 
5.4 Materials Description 
Tables 6.4-1 through 6.4-6 show the composition of the material used in the models. Material 
nomenclature for the materials used throughout this document includes: UNS S31603 stainless steel 
(referred to as 316L stainless steel); UNS S31600 stainless steel (referred to as 316 stainless steel); UNS 
S30403 stainless steel (referred to as 304L stainless steel); UNS K02700 carbon steel (referred to as 
A516 Grade 70 carbon steel); UNS N06464 low-C-Ni-Cr-Mo-Gd alloy (also referred to as Ni-Gd alloy); 
and UNS A96061 Al (referred to as Aluminum 6061). 
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Table 6.4-1. Composition and density of stainless steel 304L. (basket material) 
Element 
Composition 
(wt%)
Value Used 
(wt%)
Number Density 
[atom/(cmb)]
Carbon (C) 0.03 (max.) 0.03 1.1943E-04
Manganese (Mn) 2.00 (max.) 2.00 1.7407E-03
Phosphorus (P) 0.045 (max.) 0.045 6.9467E-05
Sulfur (S) 0.03 (max.) 0.03 4.4869E-05
Silicon (Si) 0.75 (max.) 0.75 1.2769E-03
Chromium (Cr) 18.00–20.00 19.00 1.7472E-02
Nickel (Ni) 8.00–12.00 10.00 8.1467E-03
Nitrogen (N) 0.1 0.10 3.4138E-04
Iron (Fe) Balance 68.045 5.8262E-02
Source: ASTM A 240/a 240M-97a, p.2. (UNS S30403) 
Density = 7.94 g/cm3.
Table 6.4-2. Composition and density of stainless steel 316L. (canister material) 
Element 
Composition  
(wt%)
Value Used 
(wt%)
Number Density 
[atom/(cmb)]
Carbon (C) 0.03 (max.) 0.03 1.2003E-04
Manganese (Mn) 2.00 (max.) 2.00 1.7495E-03
Phosphorus (P) 0.045(max.) 0.045 6.9819E-05
Sulfur (S) 0.03 (max.) 0.03 4.5092E-05
Silicon (Si) 1.00 (max.) 1.0 1.7111E-03
Chromium (Cr) 16.00–18.00 17.00 1.5712E-02
Nickel (Ni) 10.00–14.00 12.00 9.8253E-03
Molybdenum (Mo) 2.00–3.00 2.50 1.2523E-03
Nitrogen (N) 0.10 (max.) 0.10 3.4310E-04
Iron (Fe) Balance 65.295 5.6189E-02
Source: ASTM A 276-91a, p.2 (UNS S31603) 
Density = 7.98 g/cm3.
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Table 6.4-3. Composition and density of carbon steel A516 Grade 70 (canister impact plates) 
Element 
Composition 
(wt %) 
Value Used 
(wt%)
Number Density 
[atom/(cmb)]
Carbon (C) 0.30 (max.) 0.30 1.1021E-03
Manganese (Mn) 0.85–1.20 1.025 8.9921E-04
Phosphorous (P) 0.035 max.) 0.035 5.3419E-05
Sulfur (s) 0.035 (max.) 0.035 5.1751E-05
Silicon (Si) 0.15–0.40 0.275 4.8813E-04
Iron (Fe) Balance 98.33 8.3225E-02
Source: ASTM A 516/A 516M-90, Table 1 (UNS K02700); >2” to 4” thick plate 
Density = 7.85 g/cm3.
Table 6.4-4. Composition and density of Ni-Gd alloy. (poison material in basket grid) 
Element 
Composition (Value Used)
(wt%)
Number Density 
[atom/(cmb)]
Gd 2 6.7096E-04
Mo 14.55 8.0005E-03
Cr 15.8 1.6030E-02
Fe 1 9.4465E-04
Co 1 8.9515E-04
Ni 65.65 5.9007E-02
Density = 8.73 g/cm3
Source: ASTM B 932 - 04, Table 1 (UNS N06464). 
Table 6.4-5. Composition and density of Aluminum 6061. (cladding material) 
Element 
Compositiona
(wt%)
Value Used 
(wt%)
Mg 0.8–1.2 1 
Si 0.4–0.8 0.6 
Fe 0.7 (max) 0.7 
Cu 0.15–0.4 0.275 
Cr 0.04–0.35 0.195 
Mn 0.15 (max) 0.15 
Zn Note a 0.25 (max) 0.25 
Ti 0.15 (max) 0.15 
Al Balance 96.68 
NATIONAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL PROGRAM ENGINEERING DESIGN FILE
EDF-NSNF-068
  Revision 0
   Page 29 of 84
 Title: Criticality Analysis for Proposed Maximum Fuel Loading in a Standardized SNF Canister with Type 
1a Baskets 
Element 
Compositiona
(wt%)
Value Used 
(wt%)
Densityb = 2.7065 g/cm3
Source: a. ASM International 1990, p. 102; b. ASTM G 1-90, Table X1 indicates 2.7 
g/cm3; ASME 2001, Section II, Table NF-2 indicates a converted value from 0.098 lb/in.3
of 2.713 g/cm3; therefore, the midpoint was used.
NOTE: See Assumption 4.4. 
Table 6.4-6. ATR fuel number densities used in this report. 
Number densities used in this evaluation 
[atom/(cmb)]
Plate No. 235U 238U 234U Al
1 2.5677E-03 1.0917E-04 3.2902E-05 5.0781E-02 
2 2.4883E-03 1.0580E-04 3.1885E-05 5.0875E-02 
3 3.1422E-03 1.3360E-04 4.0264E-05 5.0098E-02 
4 3.1228E-03 1.3277E-04 4.0015E-05 5.0121E-02 
5 3.8426E-03 1.6338E-04 4.9239E-05 4.9266E-02 
6 3.8506E-03 1.6372E-04 4.9341E-05 4.9256E-02 
7 3.8512E-03 1.6374E-04 4.9348E-05 4.9256E-02 
8 3.8517E-03 1.6377E-04 4.9355E-05 4.9255E-02 
9 3.8522E-03 1.6379E-04 4.9361E-05 4.9255E-02 
10 3.8526E-03 1.6381E-04 4.9367E-05 4.9254E-02 
11 3.8531E-03 1.6383E-04 4.9372E-05 4.9253E-02 
12 3.8535E-03 1.6384E-04 4.9378E-05 4.9253E-02 
13 3.8538E-03 1.6386E-04 4.9383E-05 4.9253E-02 
14 3.8542E-03 1.6387E-04 4.9387E-05 4.9252E-02 
15 3.8596E-03 1.6410E-04 4.9456E-05 4.9246E-02 
16 3.1388E-03 1.3346E-04 4.0220E-05 5.0102E-02 
17 3.1365E-03 1.3336E-04 4.0190E-05 5.0105E-02 
18 2.5232E-03 1.0728E-04 3.2331E-05 5.0834E-02 
19 2.5234E-03 1.0729E-04 3.2334E-05 5.0834E-02 
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Fuel constituents such as boron are not included. The fissile number densities represent a slightly 
increased value for incorporating added conservatism into the model, e.g. 94% enrichment with 1085.75 g 
235U per assembly. 
6. Calculations 
This section describes the calculations performed to evaluate the keff of a sealed SNF canister 
containing one or more Type 1a baskets containing either ATR, MURR, MIT, or ORR fuels.  Section 6.1 
and 6.2 provide the details of the SNF canister and canister basket respectively. Section 6.3 covered the 
various fuels and their characteristics. Section 6.4 gives the composition of the materials used in the 
following calculations. The basic formulas used in these calculations are listed in Section 7.1. The intact, 
loaded configurations of the SNF canisters are outlined in Section 7.2, and Section 7.3 describes the various 
degraded conditions of the SNF canister internals that were evaluated. 
Avogadro's number and atomic weights are from the chart of the radionuclides in Parrington et al. 
[1996].  The number of digits in the values cited here may be the result of a calculation or may reflect the 
input from another source; consequently, the number of digits should not be interpreted as an indication of 
accuracy.  The metric units used in this document are calculated using the English units given in the cited 
references. The differences that might exist between the metric units calculated and any metric units cited in 
references have negligible effect on the calculations, and should not be interpreted as an indication of 
accuracy. 
6.1 Formulas 
The basic equation used to calculate the number density values for materials composed of one or 
more elements/isotopes is shown below. It is used in the calculations used to produce the results 
summarized in the section 7: 
N i  =  ( m i / m ) *U * N a / M i =  ( V i / V ) *U i * N a/ M i
Where:
Ni  = the number density in atoms/cm3 of the ith element/isotope  
mi  =  the mass in grams of the ith element/isotope in the material 
m = the mass in grams of the material; note that m = ¦  mi
Na = the Avogadro's number (6.022*1023 atoms/mole [Parrington et al. 1996, p. 59])
Mi = the atomic mass in g/mole of the ith element/isotope
M = the atomic mass in g/mole of the material
Vi = the volume in cm3 of the ith element/isotope in the material
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V = the volume in cm3; note that V = ¦Vi
Ui = the density of the ith element/isotope (g/cm3)
U = the density of the material (g/cm3); note that U = ¦ Ui*(Vi/V).
Volumes of cylinder segments (volume = area of circle segment x length of the cylinder) are also 
calculated, based on the equation for the area of a segment of a circle shown below [Beyer 1987, p. 125]: 
Area of a segment of a circle = ¸
¸
¹
·
¨
¨
©
§
¸
¹
·¨
©
§ 

2
1
2 2)(cos hRhhR
R
hRR
Where:
R = the cylinder radius 
h = the height of the segment. 
6.2 “As-Loaded” Configurations 
In the “as-loaded” configuration, the fuel, the canister, and its internal components are considered 
to be in their intended configuration. Modeling of the end structure of the DOE SNF canister treats both 
the impact plate and the dished head as a single piece that serves as an end reflector. The curved gap 
between the impact plate and the dished head is conservatively modeled as filled with carbon steel. 
Unless noted otherwise, the unoccupied spaces inside the DOE SNF canister are dry with the exception of 
an assumed water-logging of the fuel matrices – see Assumption 4.5.  
Figure 7.2-1 presents a cross-sectional view of the baseline intact ATR (20) configuration modeled 
with MCNP. Figures 7.2-2 through 7.2-4 reflect the baseline model configuration for the other aluminum 
plate fuels in their as-loaded configurations inside a Type 1a basket.  For conservatism, the fuels are 
placed artificially close to one another in the basket compartments for calculating maximum reactivity. 
Reality suggests a less optimal positioning of the fuel assemblies within the basket compartments at time 
of loading. 
Analyses address the as-loaded configuration for single-canister scenarios, and three different 
scenarios involving an array of canisters in a hypothetical transportation cask (see section 7.4).   
The results presented in Table 7.2-1 and Figures 7.2-1 through 7.2-4 show the relatively 
insignificant reactivities for single canisters, even when water-reflected. Both fuel and canister baskets are 
intact in these baseline analyses. The table and figures also show the small increase to single canister 
reactivity with the omission of Gd inside a water reflected canister. 
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The loading of the MURR fuels will utilize a Type 1a basket configuration that precludes loading 
the assemblies in the two center compartments (the MURR (24) center void). The results of these 
analyses are plotted in Figure 7.2-5. 
Table 7.2-1. Water-reflected, loaded SNF canister with dry/intact internals. 
Fuel Type Code Case with Gd keff +2V Code Case without Gd keff +2V
ATR (20*) atr20.o 0.1341 atr20-nogd.o 0.1825 
ATR (30**) atr30.o 0.1367 atr30-nogd.o 0.1857 
MURR (24*) mu24c.o 0.1583 mu24c-nogd.o 0.2016 
MIT (30*) mit30.o 0.1277 mit30-nogd.o 0.1742 
ORR-HEU (30*) orr30.o 0.1115 orr30-nogd.o 0.1549 
* SNF count in a 10-ft canister 
** SNF count in a 15-ft canister 
Figure 7.2-1. ATR fuel assemblies in a Type 1a basket. 
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Figure 7.2-2. MURR fuel assemblies in a Type 1a basket. 
Figure 7.2-3. ORR fuel assemblies in a Type 1a basket. 
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Figure 7.2-4. MIT fuel assemblies in a Type 1a basket. 
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Figure 7.2-5. Gd effect on system reactivity for intact internals in a single, water reflected canister with 
and without poisoning. 
Any baseline comparison case warrants an understanding of what the concentration of gadolinium 
(Gd) in the basket plate plays in meeting criticality safety. At issue is the credit allowed for any installed 
poisons. The Gd concentration in the basket plate material (UNS N06464; see Table 6.2-4) is installed to 
meet issues relative to total degradation of the fissile material inside a breached waste package within the 
post-closure repository environment. The presence of Gd is inconsequential to assuring criticality safety 
in a leak-tight canister with Type 1a basket and non-degraded fuels. No credit is being sought for the 
presence of Gd in the basket plates for any single canister configuration prior to the post-closure 
repository. Its presence is included in the model, because it is integral to any sealed canister utilizing a 
Type 1a basket configuration destined for repository disposal. 
For comparison purposes, it is important to demonstrate the margin of safety for a single canister 
that could potentially be loaded underwater. Such a condition (both filled and reflected with water) is not 
likely to occur because of the operational difficulties associated with drying and sealing such a 
configuration. The calculated reactivities shown in Table 7.2-2 and Figure 7.2-6 portray that the proposed 
canister loadings can be enveloped with the ATR analyses (as fissile loads per canister decrease, so do the 
calculated reactivities). The comparative cases between the ATR (20) and ATR (30) loads demonstrate 
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the “infinite cylinder” principal, where, after a certain length and given the same linear fissile distribution, 
the calculated reactivity remains relatively constant. 
Table 7.2-2. Results of intact fuels in a fully-flooded canister. 
Fuel Type Code Case keff +2V
ATR (20) d1cnba.o 0.6805 
ATR (30)* d1cnbb+L.o 0.6810 
MURR (24) m1a24c.o 0.6397 
MIT (30) mit1d.o 0.6135 
ORR-MEU (30) o1bleu.o  0.6439 
* in 15-ft long canister; all others in 10-ft canisters  
0.4
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0.9
1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Intact SNF in loaded canister (filled with water)
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[ center void ]
Figure 7.2-6. Calculated reactivities for intact SNF loaded in a fully-flooded canister. 
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6.3 Degraded Configurations 
Various forms of both fuel and basket degradation might occur depending on the particular 
accident scenario. The variables in terms of degree of degradation (partial versus total collapse) and 
redistribution of canister internals (both fuel and basket) are too numerous to model in any practical 
manner for the most credible condition. Rather, the models selected focus on the most reactive 
configurations, and demonstrate with supplemental models how those most reactive cases satisfy that 
contention. This places some reliance on the use of non-mechanistic configurations to demonstrate 
maximum reactivities. 
In general, highly-enriched fissile material in dry systems needs to attain the highest (most 
concentrated) fissile atom-density possible for maximum reactivity. Conversely, those same systems 
become more reactive in moderated conditions as they become more homogenous at an optimum H/X 
ratio and then less reactive as the fissile concentration becomes more dilute. The baseline cases addressed 
in these degraded case models demonstrate both these contentions. 
Degraded mode calculations consider both horizontal and vertical orientation of the canisters, for a 
single canister as well as a multi-canister arrays inside a hypothetical transport cask. Difficulties arise 
when trying to apportion and fixate the location of potentially reconfigured fissile material after any drop 
accident. Hence, degraded scenarios for these analyses conservatively assumed complete separation of the 
UAlx/Al fissile matrix from any of the cladding and assembly end fittings. Thereafter, the fuel matrix 
material is distributed within the basket compartments anywhere from a full-density matrix layer to 
uniform (homogeneous) distribution with a calculated void fraction. 
Specialized cases evaluated “what if” scenarios with axial reconfiguration of the fissile mass at the 
bottom of a vertically oriented canister and away from any of the poisoned basket material; the basket 
material becomes a reflecting surface at this point. For the worst case (non-mechanistic) scenario, all the 
fissile mass in a canister, i.e. from all the assemblies in all the baskets, is reconfigured at the fissile matrix 
production density either as a sphere or a cylindrical shape limited to the internal diameter of the canister. 
The more reactive of these two configurations was then used as the basis for analyzing the nine-pack 
canister array inside the hypothetical transport cask. 
Scenarios for fuel degradation in transportation are confined to ‘dry’ reconfiguration as a result of 
some transportation accident. For ‘dry’ fissile systems, greater compactness of the fissile material 
generally promotes greater system reactivity. The following degradation scenarios portray what are 
progressively more reactive dry configurations. For fissile materials separated from the cladding, the 
cladding ‘disappears’ from the basket compartment as the most conservative approach. Any inclusion 
would beg the question as to what orientation or position should be assumed, e.g. submerged in the matrix 
debris or floating on top. 
6.3.1 Fuel Debris Separated and Horizontally Reconfigured in Basket Compartments 
With horizontal orientation of a canister, either after a drop or during reorientation after a drop, 
analyses evaluated reactivity with the fissile matrix material separated from between the clad plates of the 
ATR fuel and then reconsolidated on the side wall of each basket compartment. A void fraction of 
varying percentages was then assigned to the fuel rubble to determine the effect on calculated reactivity. 
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Figure 7.3.1-1 depicts the configuration analyzed. All compartments were modeled with similar fuel 
rubblization, although the outer perimeter compartments result in slightly varying heights because of the 
canister radius influence on compartment area cross section.  
Figure 7.3.1-1 Cross section of canister with fuel debris separated and horizontally reconfigured in a Type 
1a basket compartment 
The first of the degraded cases examined rubblized fuel, with the fuel matrix material separating 
from between the aluminum cladding and depositing as a layer on the floor of each basket compartment 
in a horizontally oriented canister; see Figure 7.3.1-1.  Table 7.3.1-1 itemizes the results of the criticality 
calculation for this configuration; Figure 7.3.1-2 depicts the results listed in Table 7.3.1-1. This analysis 
was done with a nominal 11 vol % water assumed trapped in the interstitial voids within the ATR fuel 
matrix; this equates to an H/X ratio of approximately 2.1; analysis of other fuels used varying ‘trapped 
water’ content per Assumption 4.5. These analyses were done with four different fuel types for non-
flooded cases within the SNF canister.  The individual canisters were externally water reflected in all 
cases. 
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Table 7.3.1-1. Effect of fuel rubblization in a horizontally oriented basket compartments. 
Fuel Type 
Code Case 
(with 11 vol% 
Water in SNF) keff +2V
ATR (20) homa_0-w.o 0.0855 
ATR (30)* homa30-w.o 0.0894 
MURR (24) homa24c-w.o 0.0885 
MIT (30)** mthom_0-w.o 0.0844 
ORR-HEU (30)*** ohom_0-w.o 0.0463 
* in 15-ft long canister; all others in 10-ft canisters 
** 19.75 vol% water in fuel matrix 
*** ~30 vol% water in fuel matrix 
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Figure 7.3.1-2. Rubblized fuel in a horizontal canister.  
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6.3.2 Fuel Debris Separated and Vertically Reconfigured in Basket Compartments 
While SNF canisters are typically stored, shipped and emplaced in the repository with horizontal 
orientation, there are brief periods when the SNF canister experiences vertical orientation during loading 
and unloading operations from transport casks and/or waste packages. Such orientation with rubblized 
fuel presents a different set of neutronic interactions from that of a horizontal canister. Note that the 
vertical debris model increases the calculated reactivity by a factor of two over that of the horizontal case 
for the same fuel. 
The following reactivities were calculated as a result of assuming minimum void fraction in each of 
the fissile matrix debris piles formed in the bottom of each canister compartment; see Table 7.3.2-1. The 
analysis retained the appropriate water content in the fuel matrix material (see Assumption 4.5). Whether 
for ATR (20) two-stack in a 10-ft canister or ATR (30) three-stack arrangement inside a 15-ft canister, the 
infinite cylinder length principle, i.e. reactivity of fissile content per unit length remains constant beyond 
a given length, is demonstrated with Figure 7.3.2-1. 
Table 7.3.2-1. Reactivities for degraded fuel in a vertically oriented canister. 
Fuel Type 
Code Case 
(w/ 11 vol% water 
in SNF) keff +2V
ATR (20) homaV_0-w.o 0.1974 
ATR (30)* homaV30_0-w.o 0.1970 
MURR (24)(a) homV24_0-w.o 0.1412 
MIT (30)** mthomV_0-w.o 0.1361 
ORR-HEU (30)*** ohomV_0-w.o 0.0740 
* 15-ft long canister; others packaged in 10-ft canisters 
** 19.75 vol% water in fuel matrix 
*** ~30 vol% water in fuel matrix                                                                   
 (a) Six boundary FHUs removed from 30 FHUs; constitutes a misload. 
Note that the cases for the ATR(20) [case: homaV_0-w.o] and MURR(24) [case: homV24_0-w.o] 
become the starting points for each of the two following void fraction calculations for those respective 
fuels.
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Figure 7.3.2-1. Reactivities of degraded fuel in vertically oriented 18” canister. 
 Assigning a void fraction of varying percentages to the fuel rubble determined the effect on 
calculated reactivity. Figure 7.3.2-2 depicts a side view of three stacked, vertically oriented basket 
compartments. All compartments with fuel were modeled with similar fuel rubblization, although the 
outer perimeter compartments result in slightly varying debris heights because of the canister radius 
influence on basket compartment area cross section. 
The results shown in Table 7.3.2-2 represent the rubblization of the ATR fuel matrix material away 
from any cladding or side plates of the assemblies. All of fissile material from each fuel assembly is 
retained within its respective basket compartment in a vertical orientation. The fissile matrix also retains 
its 11 vol% water. The tabular results and Figure 7.3.2-3 demonstrate that as fissile atom densities 
decrease in a dry system with a fixed geometry, so too do the calculated reactivities. 
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Figure 7.3.2-2 Side view cross-section of two stacked, vertically oriented Type 1a basket compartments. 
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Table 7.3.2-2. Results for degraded ATR (20) fuel inside vertically oriented basket compartments. 
ATR (20) 
Vertical Code Case keff +2V
vf=0 homaV_0-w.o 0.1974 
vf=0.2 homaV_20-w.o 0.1742 
vf=0.4 homaV_40-w.o 0.1473 
vf=0.5 homaV_50-w.o 0.1320 
vf=0.6 homaV_60-w.o 0.1152 
vf=0.75 homaV_75-w.o 0.0882 
vf=0.817 (full) homaV_fl-w.o 0.0811 
*vf = void fraction (in any debris formation) 
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Figure 7.3.2-3. Reactivity as a function of void fraction in ATR fuel. 
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A similar calculation with the MURR (24) fuel packaging shows the same behavior as the ATR 
(20) fuel packaging, only with lower reactivities due to lower total fissile mass (18.79 vs. 21.7 kg 235U).
Table 7.3.2-3 and Figure 7.3.2-4 depict this trend.
Table 7.3.2-3. Results for degraded MURR (24) fuel inside vertically oriented canister compartments. 
MURR(24)(a)
Vertical Code Case keff +2V
vf=0 homV24_0-w.o 0.1412 
vf=0.2 homV24_20-w.o 0.1300 
vf=0.4 homV24_40-w.o 0.1159 
vf=0.6 homV24_60-w.o 0.0991 
vf=0.7 homV24_75-w.o 0.0900 
vf=0.78 (full) homV24_fll-w.o 0.0866 
*vf = void fraction (in any debris formation) 
(a) Six boundary FHUs removed from 30 FHUs; constitutes a misload. The ‘misload’ was 
selected for this tabular presentation because it yielded a higher reactivity than the proposed 
center void configuration. 
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Figure 7.3.2-4. Reactivity as a function of void fraction in MURR fuel. 
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6.3.3 Basket Grid Plates Fail and Reconfigure Horizontally 
The sensitivity of plate spacing was modeled by moving the horizontal plates closer together, but 
limited by the geometry of the fuel in the compartment. Figure 7.3.3-1a shows a conventional spacing of 
fuel assemblies within adjacent basket compartments.  Figure 7.3.3-1b ‘drops’ the top horizontal plate 
such that it rests on the fuel assembly below. All fuel elements in each basket compartment were placed 
closer together (vertically) as a result of this reconfiguration. The drawings are not to scale; rather they 
depict relative positioning of basket plates and fuel shapes. The degraded plate/degraded fuel condition in 
the horizontal canister orientation was not analyzed because the distribution of the fuel debris over the 
length of the canister provides such a high surface to volume ratio for neutron leakage. A more reactive 
configuration than horizontal debris formation would be bounded by the vertical (or axial) configuration 
analyzed in Section 7.3.4. 
Figure 7.3.3-1a  Conventional ATR spacing within Type 1a basket 
Figure 7.3.3-1b  Collapsed basket plates constrained by fuel shape 
To determine sensitivity to basket plate displacement, the analysis posed a canister side-drop where 
the plates would somehow move closer together until they were touching the ATR assemblies. All other 
parameters were retained (11 vol% water in ATR fuel matrix, water reflection of the canister, and no fuel 
or canister deformation). The results shown in Table 7.2-5 show a slight increase in reactivity (keff = 
0.1407) versus the undamaged configuration for ATR (30) fuels in an intact basket of keff = 0.1367 (see 
Table 7.1-1). 
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Table 7.3.3-1. Result for ATR (30) fuel side drop. 
Fuel Type Code Case keff +2V
ATR (30) atr30-side-dropr.o 0.1384 
6.3.4 Basket Base Plates Fail and Fuel Debris Reconfigures Vertically 
More reactive debris configuration than the horizontal orientation, this model analyzed the artificial 
positioning of the basket base plates at the bottom of the canister, and with the fuel matrix debris from all 
three baskets collected and consolidated as a single layer in the bottom of a vertically oriented SNF 
canister. This constitutes the axial reconfiguration scenario. This is strictly a non-mechanistic 
reconfiguration, as there are no accident scenarios that might allow the base plates to separate from their 
respective baskets while maintaining relative positioning of the basket side plates. This simplified model 
is depicted in Figure 7.3.4-1. The analysis modeled each of the compartments with the fuel matrix debris 
material from the above compartments in a three stack basket arrangement. 
Although limited in nature because of the small amount of time any canister spends in a vertical 
orientation, axial reconfiguration of the fuel has always posed the greatest concern in terms of increased 
reactivity due to accident scenarios. Whether rubblization of the canister internals occurs with a vertical 
drop scenario, or a side drop and a vertical orientation upon recovery efforts, fissile material 
reconfiguration needed to be addressed for SNF canisters in transport. An axial reconfiguration scenario 
examined rubblization of the fuel in a three-stack ATR (30), with the fuel matrix material separating from 
between the aluminum cladding and collecting inside the bottom 10 basket compartments. Once again 
with the 11 vol% water in the fuel matrix and external water reflection, the most reactive condition is the 
consolidated debris with minimal void fraction. These results are shown in Table 7.3.4-1 and Figure 
7.3.4-2. 
Table 7.3.4-1. Result for ATR (30) fuel end-drop. 
 ATR End Drop keff +2V
vf=0.0 homaE_0.o 0.4097 
vf=0.20 homaE_20.o 0.3667 
vf=0.50 homaE_50.o 0.2868 
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Figure 7.3.4-1 Collapsed basket plates and fuel debris constrained in basket compartments 
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Figure 7.3.4-2. Reactivity in a vertically oriented canister with fuel degraded and reconfigured in one set 
of basket compartments. 
6.3.5 Fuel non-mechanistically separates and assembles in a sphere below basket and 
cladding material 
Figure 7.3.5-1 represents what was expected to be the most reactive configuration based on 
knowledge of the neutronics typically associated with bare spherical assembly of fissile material. A 
sphere represents the most optimal shaped and smallest surface/volume ratio for neutron economy. 
The most extreme degradation case examines a non-mechanistic configuration. This involves axial 
reconfiguration of the fuel matrix material, with the mass of fuel matrix material in a single canister 
forming into a spherical geometry below and away from all poisoned basket plate material. The spherical 
shape is typically considered to be the most reactive geometry for any dry fissile system. The results for 
this scenario for both the ATR (30) and MURR (24) are provided in Table 7.3.5-1. 
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Figure 7.3.5-1. Spherical fuel debris without poison in sphere. 
Table 7.3.5-1. Results of degraded spherical fuel matrix mass in SNF canister. 
Fuel Type Code Case keff +2V
ATR (30) (sphere) sph_0.o 0.5479 
MURR (24) sph-mu2410.o 0.4160 
6.3.6 Fuel non-mechanistically separates and assembles in a cylinder below basket 
and cladding material 
An adjunct calculation examined cylindrical fuel debris formation in the bottom of a vertically 
oriented SNF canister. The cylindrical shape was limited by the internal diameter of the SNF canister, and 
the base plates and basket debris constituted reflective boundaries. This cylindrical model better 
represents the artificial reassembly of fuel matrix debris in the bottom of the canister. This scenario is 
depicted in Figure 7.3.6-1. 
SNF Canister 
Poisoned basket 
debris & cladding 
Reconfigured fuel mass 
(32.55 kg 235U at 93.2% 
enriched and 17.97 cm 
sphere radius for 
ATR [30] fuel debris)  
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Figure 7.3.6-1. Cylindrical fuel debris without poison in cylinder. 
The results shown in Table 7.3.6-1 for any of the aluminum plate fuels shows a slightly increased 
reactivity over that calculated for the spherical geometry in the preceding table. This increase is attributed 
to the reflective nature of the boundaries imposed by the canister wall, top and bottom reflection by the 
basket plates and bottom canister impact plate, respectively, and the external water reflection of the 
canister. This configuration of the ATR (30) canister was then used as the most reactive case for modeling 
in hypothetical transport cask analysis (see Section 7.4). No attempt was made to optimize the L/D ratio 
of the cylindrical shape at the bottom of the canister, since rubblizing the fuel to the extent necessary to 
migrate and reform the fuel debris in the bottom of the canister would fill all voids radially. 
Table 7.3.6-1. Results of degraded cylindrical fuel matrix mass in SNF canister. 
Fuel Type Code Case keff +2V
ATR (30) cyl_0+ca.o 0.6249 
MURR (24) cy_0-mu24.o 0.4625 
MIT (30) cy_0-mit.o 0.5026 
ORR-MEU (30) cy_0-orr.o 0.5440 
Reconfigured fuel mass 
(32.55 kg 235U at 93.2% 
enriched and 42.61 cm 
diameter cylinder/ 
17.08 cm height for 
ATR [30])  
SNF
Canister
Poisoned basket 
debris & cladding 
Three basket 
base plates 
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The calculated reactivity for the MIT and ORR fuels is attributed to the size difference in the 
cylindrical geometry because of the different matrix (oxide versus silicide versus aluminide) and the 
increased water volume % increase in the fuel matrix (see Assumption 4.5). The ATR (30) still represents 
the bounding case for maximum reactivity. 
0
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Degraded SNF in cylindrical form
kg U235 in 18" diameter canister
Figure 7.3.6-2. Degraded fuel accumulated in the bottom of a vertically oriented cask. 
6.3.7 Fuel Debris in a Flooded Canister 
As a confirmatory analysis for problems that might arise with breach and flooding of a loaded 
canister, the analyst examined non-mechanistically degraded ATR fuel assemblies still contained within 
their poisoned basket compartments, but with full flooding in the SNF canister. This model is a variant of 
Figure 7.3.2-2, only with water inserted into the void fraction within the fuel debris. The various water 
volume fractions (wvf) shown in the 4th column of Table 7.3.7-1 represent the differences in free volume 
within each of the three separate basket compartment volumes (created because of the way the basket 
compartment volumes are defined by the basket divider positions). Given the fully loaded 15’ canister 
with ATR fuel, the typical subcritical limit of 0.95 could be exceeded, given maximal fuel rubblization 
and optimum moderation.  
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Table 7.3.7-1. Results of degraded and flooded ATR fuel matrix mass in SNF canister. 
keff r V keff + 2V
AENCF
keV Comment File Name 
0.9508 ± 0.0008 0.9523 10.0
wvf= 0.817, 0.792 and 0.775; fuel 
compartments are completely full; 3 
baskets in a 15' SNF canister  
homa_fl+L.o 
6.4 Hypothetical Cask Configurations 
While the future cask vendor will perform final criticality safety evaluations for the authorized cask 
configuration, it is of interest to know a priori the potential for being able to transport multiple SNF 
canisters while maintaining adequate margins of criticality safety. To this end, analyses were performed 
with a hypothetical transport cask/basket combination using both a nine-pack and seven-pack canister 
array.  
Four cask configurations were evaluated.  The first is based on a flooded cask with all of the 
canisters in their worst-case single canister reactivities (“basket base plates fail and reconfigure 
vertically” scenario).  The next three are with the canisters in their “as-loaded” configuration but with 
three different scenarios relative to inleakage of water.  
x canisters dry and the cask cavity flooded.   
x cask and the canister cavities flooded.
x canisters flooded and the cask cavity dry.  This case represents the differentially flooded 
scenario in which both cask and canisters were flooded, but in which the cask cavity drains 
at a more rapid rate than the canister cavities.   
The 9-pack array was modeled as a centering pipe (20” XS pipe in 304L SS [0.500” wall 
thickness]) with eight canisters arrayed around the outside and separated by 0.500” thick plates; see 
Figure 7.4-2a. The fissile matrix inside the SNF canisters incorporates the vol% water appropriate to the 
fuel analyzed (see Assumption 4.5).  Each case for the flooded cask configurations evaluated 0%, 10%, 
and 100% flooding outside the canisters in the array (to model the potential breach of the transport cask).  
A similar criticality analysis was completed with a 7-pack array; see Figure 7.4-2b. This 
configuration was selected because of the concerns related to apparent dimensional constraints found in a 
9-pack array, and also because a triangular pitch is known to produce a more reactive configuration. The 
basket model used the same 0.5-in. compartment thickness for each of the SNF canisters.
NATIONAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL PROGRAM ENGINEERING DESIGN FILE
EDF-NSNF-068
  Revision 0
   Page 53 of 84
 Title: Criticality Analysis for Proposed Maximum Fuel Loading in a Standardized SNF Canister with Type 
1a Baskets 
All cases showed decreasing reactivities with both decreased fissile loads (as expected with 
decreased fissile atom densities) in their canisters, and with increased flooding inside the transport cask. 
These results are shown in Table 7.4-1 and Figure 7.4-1. Decreased reactivities with decreased fissile 
loads is an expected condition due to lower fissile masses, and the concurrent decrease in either fissile 
mass geometry of decreased fissile atom density as a function of the fissile matrix composition. Addition 
of water to the transport cask provides an effective neutronic isolation barrier. Thermalized neutrons are 
more subject to capture if reflected into the SNF canister with its Gd-poisoned basket, or ultimate capture 
or escape outside the canisters. 
Table 7.4-1. Results of nine aluminum fueled canisters loaded in a cask. 
Fuel Type 
Water Volume 
Fraction Outside 
Canisters
(%) Code Case keff +2V
0 m9cya_0.o 0.8656 
1 m9cya_1.o 0.8666 
2 m9cya_2.o 0.8625 
3 m9cya_3.o 0.8617 
4 m9cya_4.o 0.8580 
5 m9cya_5.o 0.8550 
6 m9cya_6.o 0.8523 
7 m9cya_7.o 0.8491 
8 m9cya_8.o 0.8450 
9 m9cya_9.o 0.8426 
10 m9cya_10.o 0.8386 
ATR (30) 
100 m9cya_100.o 0.7472 
0 m9cy_0.o 0.6568 
10 m9cy_10.o 0.6339 MURR (24) 
100 m9cy_100.o 0.5721 
0 m9cymi_0.o 0.7013 
10 m9cymi_10.o 0.6893 MIT (30) 
100 m9cymi_100.o 0.6261 
0 m9cyo_0.o 0.6960 
10 m9cyo_10.o 0.6729 ORR-MEU (30) 
100 m9cyo_100.o 0.6281 
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Figure 7.4-1. Flooded transport cask with degraded fuel in most reactive (cylindrical- vertical) SNF nine-
pack canister. 
Follow-up calculations addressed reactivities for a combination of flooded cask and/or canisters 
with intact internals. Using the ATR(30) model, configurations were examined in both nine-pack and 
seven-pack arrays as shown in Figures 7.4-2a and 7.4-2b respectively. The seven-pack array provides a 
better probability of being able to fit the canisters inside a transport cask. Result show that the hex array 
configuration modeled in the seven-pack proved just as reactive as the nine-pack array in spite of the 22% 
decrease in fissile load in the transport cask. 
The intact analyses examined: (1) dry canisters / dry cask, (2) dry canisters / flooded cask, (3) 
flooded canisters / flooded cask, and (4) flooded canisters / dry cask [the differentially flooded case]. As 
displayed in Table 7.4-2, all conditions remained subcritical. Two special cases were analyzed without the 
benefit of Gd-poisoned basket materials inside the SNF canisters (300 series stainless steel substituted); 
while reactivity increased substantially for the loaded cask, the results remained below any expected 
NATIONAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL PROGRAM ENGINEERING DESIGN FILE
EDF-NSNF-068
  Revision 0
   Page 55 of 84
 Title: Criticality Analysis for Proposed Maximum Fuel Loading in a Standardized SNF Canister with Type 
1a Baskets 
subcritical limit. These specific results reinforce the concept that poisoning of the canisters is needed to 
support only the hypothetical degradation scenarios associated with post-closure conditions in the 
repository. Whether transportation requirements allow credit for only a portion of installed poisons or 
none at all in the SNF canister appears to be a moot point. 
Figure 7.4-2a  Nine-pack transport cask array 
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Figure 7.4-2b  Seven-pack transport cask array 
Table 7.4-2  Reactivities of ATR(30) loaded fuel canisters w/ intact internals inside a transport cask 
 9-pack canister array - fuel baskets (ANA w/ 2% Gd) and fuels intact 
         
 Cask --> - dry    - flooded   
  (keff + 2V)  Code case  (keff + 2V)  Code case 
-dry 0.2710  csk9int_dd.o  0.1876  csk9int_wd.o 
        
-flooded 0.7076  csk9int_dw.o  0.6701  csk9int_ww.o 
 0.8787*  csk9int_dwSS.o** 0.8364*  csk9int_wwSS.o 
        
7-pack (hex) canister array- fuel baskets (ANA w/ 2% Gd) and fuels intact 
        
-flooded 0.7036  csk7int_dwH.o  - - -  - - - 
<-
- C
an
is
te
rs
 --
> 
 0.8776*  csk7int_dwHSS.o** - - -  - - - 
         
 * SS basket rather than ANA   
 ** Differentially flooded 'worst case'  
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As shown in the dry canister/dry cask case, the reactivity of the loaded cask (whether a seven- or 
nine-pack) is relatively benign given any non-moderated neutrons in the package. Addition of water into 
the transport cask (but with dry canisters) drops the calculated reactivity from 0.2710 Æ 0.1876 due to the 
added neutronic isolation provided between canisters. Thermalization of neutrons under these 
circumstances makes their incidental capture more likely. Addition of water to the flooded canisters 
inside the flooded cask shows an appreciable but still acceptable increase in system reactivity (0.6701); 
the thermalization of neutrons also increases the effectiveness of the Gd poisoning present in the basket 
material. In the differentially flooded case (canisters flooded / cask dry), the reactivity increases (0.6701 
Æ 0.7076) with the decrease in the neutronic isolation between canisters.  Yet even without poisoning in 
the basket material as modeled with stainless steel in place of ANA material, the calculated reactivity 
remains subcritical (keff<0.90). 
Dimensional constraints within a nine-pack loading in a transport cask suggested a smaller array 
might be required to assure an ability to actually load a transport cask. Such an array used the same wall 
compartment thickness between canisters (0.50” 300 series stainless steel). Even with removal of  22.2% 
of the fissile material in a transports cask, the resulting hex array proved as reactive as the nine-pack array 
in its most reactive (differentially flooded) case because of better neutronic coupling between the 
canisters. Yet this configuration can still remain subcritical, even with the removal of Gd poisoning from 
the canister baskets. If needed, the reactivity of the loaded cask can be further reduced by increased 
spacing between canisters or use of a poisoned cask insert. 
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6.5 Benchmark Evaluations 
NSNFP has proposed use of the TSUNAMI computer code to identify applicable benchmark 
experiments to aid in determining an appropriate calculational bias. The TSUNAMI-3D sensitivity and 
uncertainty calculation sequence in SCALE 5 [SCALE 2005] was used to determine whether currently 
available benchmark experiments adequately cover the application cases. 
TSUNAMI is a software code that allows for comparison of existing criticality benchmarks 
through a range-of-applicability analysis. The following is from a TSUNAMI training document [SCALE 
2005, pg. 4]: 
Integral Indices Assess Similarity 
x Correlation coefficient, ck, gives degree of shared variance in keff between design application and 
benchmark experiment. Requires cross-section covariance data. 
   ck = 
ea
ae
VV
V 2
Acceptance Criteria for ck
x Values of ck relating a single experiment to a single application: 
- 1.0 systems are identical 
- 0.0 systems completely different 
- 0.9 - 1.0 systems are similar 
- 0.8 - 0.9 systems may be similar 
- (80-90% of uncertainty is common to both systems). 
Covariance between Experiment (e) 
and Application (a) due to all nuclides 
and reactions 
Standard deviations for Application (a) and 
Experiment (e) due to all nuclides and 
reactions
NATIONAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL PROGRAM ENGINEERING DESIGN FILE
EDF-NSNF-068
  Revision 0
   Page 59 of 84
 Title: Criticality Analysis for Proposed Maximum Fuel Loading in a Standardized SNF Canister with Type 
1a Baskets 
The criticality calculations for the spherical and cylindrical model used the MCNP 4b code. The 
use of TSUNAMI requires a KENO model when calculating both the application and benchmark cases, 
the two most reactive cases were selected and converted from MCNP into KENO input format. These 
cases are (1) a SNF canister model with spherical degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel (sph_0) and (2) a 
SNF canister model with cylindrical degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel (cyl_0+ca). To represent the 
dry system, water reflection outside the canister was removed. Table 7.5.1 shows a side-by-side 
comparison of the keffs for the MCNP and KENO codes for both the spherical and cylindrical models. The 
MCNP models used ENDF/B-V continuous cross sections with light water hydrogen scattering. The 
KENO model used 238 energy group ENDF/B-V cross sections. 
Table 7.5-1. Comparison of MCNP and KENO models. 
Model MCNP KENO V.a 
Spherical Fuel Model 0.4189 ± 0.0005 0.4234 ± 0.0006 
Cylindrical Fuel Model 0.4987 ± 0.0006 0.5081 ± 0.0003 
The calculated difference between MCNP and KENO for the spherical model is: 
%1.1100
4189.0
4189.04234.0%  u Differencekeff
The calculated difference between MCNP and KENO for the cylindrical model is:  
%8.1100
4987.0
4987.05078.0%  u Differencekeff
The TSUNAMI-3D sequence calculates the forward and adjoint angular flux and then performs 
first order linear perturbation to determine cross-section sensitivity. Because the neutron spectrum is quite 
hard, the adjoint calculation requires significantly higher number of neutrons per generation 
(approximately 80,000) than in the forward case. This is necessary to achieve agreement between the 
forward keff and the adjoint keff. The model used the TSUNAMI default of S10 quadrature for calculating 
the angular flux. Also, it must be noted that the geometry models require subdivision using spherical or 
cylindrical shells. The geometry subdivision is needed to obtain adequate resolution of the forward and 
adjoint angular flux. Accurate forward and adjoint flux values are essential for the perturbation 
calculation, which is the key to TSUNAMI results. 
Examination of the TSUNAMI-3D produced sensitivity data file associated with the spherical 
application model (see Figure 7.5-1) shows that the 235U fission cross-section sensitivity dominates. 
However, the hydrogen scattering and aluminum scattering sensitivities are comparable to the 235U fission 
sensitivity over much of the energy spectrum. 
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Figure 7.5-1. Scattering sensitivities. 
6.5.1 Applicability of Benchmark Experiments 
The analyses for the axial reconfiguration of ATR fuel matrix material away from the poisoned 
basket materials suggests benchmark experiments, such as GODIVA or other HEU fast systems, may be 
applicable. However, unlike GODIVA, the application cases are not devoid of hydrogen. For instance the 
spherical assembly model H/X ratio is 2.1. Furthermore, the aluminum content of the application cases is 
quite high. For instance, the Al/X ratio is 14.5 for the spherical assembly model. Thus, several other 
benchmark experiments were selected from the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety 
Benchmark Experiments (ICSBE) (ICSBE 2004). 
The TSUNAMI-3D and the TSUNAMI-IP calculations were performed for the two SNF canister 
models to determine area of applicability. Because the canister models are fast systems, fast benchmark 
experiments from the ICSBE Handbook (ICSBE 2004) were examined. Initially, six evaluations from the 
Handbook were selected, and the TSUNAMI-3D and TSUNAMI-IP runs were made to calculate 
correlation coefficient, ck. The models selected for evaluations are listed in Table 7.5-2. 
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Table 7.5-2. Initial comparison models. 
Benchmark Experiment 
I.D. Description
HEU-MET-FAST-001 Bare, HEU sphere experiment (GODIVA) performed at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory. 
HEU-MET-FAST-007 U metal slabs moderated with polyethylene, Plexiglas®, and Teflon®
experiments performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Case 2 
was evaluated. 
HEU-MET-FAST-021 Steel reflected spherical assembly of U-235 (90%) experiment 
performed at VNIIEF. 
HEU-MET-FAST-022 Duralumin reflected spherical assembly of U-235 (90%) experiment 
performed at VNIIEF. 
HEU-MET-FAST-065 Unreflected cylinder of HEU experiment performed by VNIIEF. 
HEU-MET-MIXED-005 Critical experiments with heterogeneous compositions of HEU, 
SiO2, and polyethylene performed in the Institute of Physics and 
Power Engineering (IPPE) at the Big Physical Stand (BFS) facility. 
Five experiments were evaluated. 
Fourteen cases were subsequently evaluated, as shown in Table 7.5-3. In some cases, the water in 
the fuel was removed to compare the ck values; ck ranged from 0.34 to 0.90. The most similar system was 
Case 5 of the BFS experiments (BFS-79-5 2000). In literally all cases, the MCNP calculated a higher 
reactivity when compared to the KENO model. 
Table 7.5-3. ck values and keff’s for application and benchmark experiments. 
Benchmark 
Experiment Application 
MCNP 4b, 
keff + 2V
KENO V.a, 
keff + 2V ck
GODIVA 
(HEU-MET-FAST-001) 
SNF canister model with cylindrical 
degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel 
0.9986 0.9978 0.48 
GODIVA 
(HEU-MET-FAST-001) 
SNF canister model with cylindrical 
degraded ATR fuel without water in fuel 
0.9986 0.9978 0.73 
ORNL
(HEU-MET-FAST-007) 
SNF canister model with cylindrical 
degraded ATR fuel without water in fuel 
0.9973 0.9944 0.67 
VNIIEF 
(HEU-MET-021) 
SNF canister model with cylindrical 
degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel 
1.0082 1.0055 0.84 
VNIIEF 
(HEU-MET-065) 
SNF canister model with cylindrical 
degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel 
0.9976 0.9968 0.85 
BFS-79-1
(HEU-MET-MIXED-005) 
SNF canister model with cylindrical 
degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel 
1.0139 0.9994 0.79 
BFS-79-2 SNF canister model with cylindrical 1.0239 1.0045 0.66 
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Benchmark 
Experiment Application 
MCNP 4b, 
keff + 2V
KENO V.a, 
keff + 2V ck
(HEU-MET-MIXED-005) degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel 
BFS-79-3
(HEU-MET-MIXED-005) 
SNF canister model with cylindrical 
degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel 
1.0199 1.0008 0.34 
BFS-79-4
(HEU-MET-MIXED-005) 
SNF canister model with cylindrical 
degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel 
1.0170 1.0067 0.85 
BFS-79-5
(HEU-MET-MIXED-005) 
SNF canister model with cylindrical 
degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel 
1.0074 0.9953 0.91 
GODIVA 
(HEU-MET-FAST-001) 
SNF canister model with spherical 
degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel 
0.9986 0.9978 0.62 
VNIIEF (HEU-MET-065) SNF canister model with spherical 
degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel 
0.9976 0.9968 0.61 
VNIIEF 
(HEU-MET-FAST-022) 
SNF canister model with spherical 
degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel 
0.9935 0.9934 0.64 
BFS-79-5
(HEU-MET-MIXED-005) 
SNF canister model with spherical 
degraded ATR fuel with water in fuel 
1.0074 0.9953 0.86 
Figure 7.5-2 shows the 235U fission cross-section sensitivity for the spherical model application 
case compared with the duralumin reflected U sphere (HEU-MET-FAST-022) and the heterogeneous 
Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) experiment (HEU-MET-MIXED-005). The figure 
shows that the duralumin reflected sphere and IPPE experiments envelop the 235U fission cross-section 
sensitivity for the spherical application case. 
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Figure 7.5-2. Cross-section sensitivity model comparisons. 
Figure 7.5-3 shows the 27Al scattering cross-section sensitivity for the spherical model application 
case compared with the duralumin reflected U sphere (HEU-MET-FAST-022) and the heterogeneous 
IPPE experiment (HEU-MET-MIXED-005). The figure shows that the IPPE experiment is relatively 
insensitive to the 27Al scattering cross section. The duralumin reflected experiment shows comparatively 
significant sensitivity to the 27Al scattering cross section, but it does not envelope the 27Al scattering 
cross-section sensitivity for the spherical model application. 
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Figure 7.5-3. 27Al scattering cross-section sensitivity. 
Figure 7.5-4 shows the hydrogen scattering cross-section sensitivity for the spherical model 
application case compared with the heterogeneous IPPE experiment. The duralumin reflected experiment 
did not contain hydrogen. The figure shows that the IPPE experiment is relatively insensitive to the 
hydrogen scattering cross section and does not envelope the sensitivity for the spherical model 
application.
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Figure 7.5-4. Hydrogen scatter sensitivity. 
Directly out of the HEU-MET-MIXED-005 report, Section 4.0, Results of Sample Calculations 
states: “Many of the calculated results presented in Table 6 exceed the benchmark-model keff value by 
over 1%. The specific reasons for this are unknown.” So even this best specific benchmark has a degree 
of uncertainty associated with the reactivity measurements. The HEU-MET-MIXED-005 contains some 
Fe in the system, heterogeneous SiO2 with Al-clad HEU pucks, and slightly higher moderation rather than 
homogeneous UAlx models. 
The spherical and cylindrical shapes of the debris modeled for the ATR fuels are represented with 
the UAlx/Al fuel matrix from within the plates of the ATR assembly. As such, these models are 
represented by a homogenous reconfiguration of the matrix material. The HEU-MET-MIXED-005, which 
provides the highest ck, is a heterogeneous, large-core reactor configuration. The canister model with 
degraded ATR fuel is basically a dry, fast system of rather small volume. 
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Based on the initial TSUNAMI calculation results, there appears to be insufficient availability of 
applicable benchmark critical experiments to quantitatively establish a calculation bias for the criticality 
scenarios under consideration. However, the TSUNAMI results confirm that applicable critical 
benchmark experiments are available for the dominant cross section of concern for the application cases, 
such as 235U fission. The lack of identified applicable benchmark experiments for 27Al and hydrogen 
suggests that a calculation bias should be applied. Furthermore, it appears that calculations for the 
application cases performed with MCNP may tend to be approximately 2% less than the calculation 
results obtained from KENO. Therefore, an added calculation bias of 5% is considered sufficient to 
ensure conservative results. 
Based on the initial TSUNAMI calculations, no experiments in the ICSBE Handbook adequately 
represent the characteristics of this dry 235U/Al system. Without meaningful comparative benchmarks, 
parameters such as pitch-to-rod diameter, assembly separation, and presence of neutron absorber material 
are inconsequential to establishing viable benchmarks for the dry 235U/Al system. A more comprehensive 
TSUNAMI analysis may involve examination of over 100 benchmark experiments without yielding any 
other or more meaningful benchmarks given the relatively few ‘dry’ critical benchmarks. 
The 5% bias and uncertainties typically assigned to established benchmarks cannot be supported 
with these analyses when dealing with this dry, critical system. However, given the conservatisms already 
incorporated in the 235U/Al model, a negotiated administrative margin of perhaps 5% could be added to 
such a non-benchmarked system so that a subcritical limit with a keff +2V less than 0.90 is considered to 
provide a suitable margin of safety. 
7. Summary 
Four different aluminum plate fuel types were analyzed in a leak-tight standardized DOE SNF 
canister, with internal conditions ranging from intact to non-mechanistic worst case scenarios. Analyses 
were performed for single canisters as well as a nine-pack array using the most reactive single canister. 
The reactivity of the various dry-fuel configurations has been shown to be a direct function of the fissile 
mass per canister and the most consolidated fissile mass. 
7.1.1 Intact Cases 
A 15-ft. canister loading configuration containing three Type 1a baskets, each basket containing 10 
ATR fuel assemblies, is considered the limiting case from a criticality safety perspective. This 
configuration will establish the canister loading limits in terms of total fissile (kg) and linear loading 
(g/cm) within the canister. As such, this configuration is expected to bound any other fuel type(s) that will 
be loaded into a canister using a Type 1a basket.  
Analyses for intact fuels were completed for a single, dry as-loaded canister for four different 
aluminum plate fuels, such as ATR, MURR, ORR, and MIT utilizing a Type 1a basket. For comparison 
purposes, the same canister model was also analyzed without the presence of Gd in the basket plate 
material. In none of these cases did the calculated reactivity, as measured by keff +2V rise above 0.20. All 
analyses were conducted with  water (see Assumption 4.5) in the fuel matrix and full water reflection of 
the canister. To further demonstrate the adequacy of the criticality safety for the single canister, the 
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loaded canisters were also analyzed intact and fully-flooded. For the proposed canister loadings, the 
calculated reactivities remained below a keff +2V < 0.6810 when flooded. 
Reactivity of the fuels has been shown to be a direct function of the fissile mass per canister. 
Accident conditions that might lead to axial reconfiguration of fissile material inside a vertically oriented 
canister are of primary concern for any canister handling prior to placement in the repository. In a 
moderator-excluded condition inside a loaded canister, invariably a more consolidated fissile mass 
produces the more reactive system.  
7.1.2 Degraded Cases 
Accident conditions that might lead to axial reconfiguration of fissile material inside a vertically 
oriented canister are of primary concern for transportation. Analyses for post-closure repository scenarios 
have already demonstrated criticality safety for horizontal configurations under fully degraded conditions. 
[CRWMS 2004] Analysis of canisters postulated to undergo various accident conditions during handling 
and transport operations considered vertical orientation with rubblization of the fuels. The accident 
scenarios were non-mechanistic, relying on postulated conditions to create most reactive configurations. 
Intermediate cases with baskets intact and fuels degraded, and basket deformation with fuels intact were 
also evaluated. Calculations employed a vertical canister orientation when in search of the most reactive 
configuration; in these vertical cases, all four fuel types were evaluated. As fuel matrix 
consolidation/concentration occurs, whether in the bottom of each basket or the bottom of the canister 
upon basket failure, subcritical limits are never exceeded under any proposed reconfiguration. 
Results for degraded fuels with the vertical orientation also calculated the net effect of what void 
fraction in the rubble contributes or detracts from reactivity. Tables 7.2-2 and 7.2-3 (along with their 
accompanying figures) demonstrate that increased void fractions in the fuel rubble generate predictable 
decreases in reactivity due to the decreased fissile atom densities in the reactive zones in each basket. 
Consequently, configurations with all the fissile material concentrated into the bottom of a canister were 
evaluated to determine the bounding case.  
Deflections of the various basket components were analyzed for increased reactivity for both side-
drops and end-drops of a canister loaded with 30 ATR assemblies. In the case of the side drop, the 
assumption was the compartment plates somehow fractured and settled on the intact fuels in the 
compartment below. This resulted in a slight increase in reactivity from 0.1367 (see Table 7.1-1; case 
atr30.0) to 0.1407 (see Table 7.2-5). The more reactive increase occurred with an end-drop of the ATR 
(30), where all the fuel matrix material from 30 ATR assemblies reconfigured in the bottom basket; this 
configuration assumes loss of separation between baskets because of damage to the basket base plates. 
Once again, the vertical reconfiguration with minimum void fraction provided the maximum calculated 
reactivity for the enveloping fuel (see Table 7.2-6). 
For extreme cases, all loss of basket and fuel geometry allowed for formation of a spherical shape 
in the bottom of the canister. The spherical shape was chosen for reasons known to promote minimum 
critical mass because it provides the smallest surface to volume ratio contributing to neutron leakage. 
Reactivity increased to approximately 0.55 for a 15-ft. canister loaded with ATR fuel (see Table 7.2-7; 
case sph_0.o). Analyses also examined a slightly more probable configuration with the fissile matrix 
debris forming a cylinder in the bottom of the canister, limited by the internal diameter of the SNF 
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canister itself. Because this resulted in a more reactive configuration than the spherical shape (keff +2V
0.6249), all four fuel types were analyzed in this configuration. The results for these single canister 
reactivities are shown in Table 7.2-8. 
A confirmatory analysis examined non-mechanistically degraded ATR fuel assemblies still 
contained within their poisoned basket compartments, but with full flooding in the SNF canister. Given a 
fully loaded 15’ canister with ATR fuel, the typical subcritical limit of 0.95 would be exceeded, given 
maximal fuel rubblization and canister flooding regardless of canister orientation.  
The last analyses also considered a hypothetical transport cask configuration to identify whether 
multiple canisters might be shipped safely. The nine-pack transportation arrays used the most reactive 
configuration as the input to the transport cask array calculations. The transport cask array values (see 
Table 7.3-1) evaluated the canisters with moderator exclusion, with 10% water density inside the 
transport cask and the transport cask fully flooded. Addition of water to a loaded transport cask appears to 
neutronically isolate the canisters. Although criticality calculations for the loaded transportation package 
will be done through the selected transportation cask vendor, these results indicate that with leak-tight 
canisters, criticality safety of the loaded cask can be demonstrated for all required transportation 
scenarios. Expansion of these transport cask analyses also included intact canister scenarios for all 
combinations of dry and flooded, both transport cask and SNF canisters. None of these calculated 
reactivities resulted in keff +2V greater than 0.90. 
7.1.3 Benchmarks 
Benchmarks for dry systems, and more particularly systems with a variety of compositions for the 
fissile matrix material, are virtually nonexistent. 
Greater biases and uncertainties are expected for transportation, but the ability to meet the 
subcritical limits for transportation can very likely be met given the criticality safety margins already 
calculated for the configurations analyzed in this report. 
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Appendix A 
MCNP Code – Input files 
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Appendix A 
MCNP Code – Input files 
input file name date created size bytes  input file name 
date 
created size bytes 
 Directory Table7.2-1   Directory Table7.3.3-1 
atr20 2/15/2007 31,094  atr30-side-dropr 2/15/2007 30,827 
atr20-nogd 2/15/2007 31,094     
atr30 2/15/2007 31,231     
atr30-nogd 2/15/2007 31,229   Directory Table7.3.4-1 
mit30 2/15/2007 21,011  homaE_0 2/15/2007 16,007 
mit30-nogd 2/15/2007 21,011  homaE_20 2/15/2007 16,014 
mu24c 2/15/2007 28,409  homaE_50 2/15/2007 16,014 
mu24c-nogd 2/15/2007 28,409     
orr30 2/15/2007 23,712     
orr30-nogd 2/15/2007 23,712   Directory Table7.3.5-1 
    sph-mu2410 2/15/2007 6,573 
    sph_0 2/15/2007 6,632 
 Directory Table7.2-2     
d1cnba 2/15/2007 34,839     
d1cnbb+L 2/15/2007 35,022   Directory Table7.3.6-1 
m1a24c 2/15/2007 31,911  cyl_0+ca 2/15/2007 7,028 
mit1d 2/15/2007 24,586  cy_0-mit 2/15/2007 6,951 
o1bleu 2/15/2007 27,483  cy_0-mu24 2/15/2007 6,951 
    cy_0-orr 2/15/2007 6,977 
       
 Directory Table7.3.1-1     
homa24c-w 2/15/2007 20,014   Directory Table7.3.7-1 
homa30-w 2/15/2007 20,223  homa_fl+L 2/15/2007 20,958 
homa_0-w 2/15/2007 20,090     
mthom_0-w 2/15/2007 20,076     
ohom_0-w 2/15/2007 20,080   Directory Table7.4-1 
    m9cya_0 2/15/2007 8,427 
    m9cya_10 2/15/2007 8,048 
 Directory Table7.3.2-1  m9cya_100 2/15/2007 8,038 
homaV30_0-w 2/15/2007 20,422  m9cymi_0 2/15/2007 8,348 
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homaV_0-w 2/15/2007 20,084  m9cymi_10 2/15/2007 8,438 
homV24_0-w 2/15/2007 19,625  m9cymi_100 2/15/2007 8,429 
mthomV_0-w 2/15/2007 20,267  m9cyo_0 2/15/2007 8,375 
ohomV_0-w 2/15/2007 20,272  m9cyo_10 2/15/2007 8,474 
    m9cyo_100 2/15/2007 8,465 
    m9cy_0 2/15/2007 8,348 
 Directory Table7.3.2-2  m9cy_10 2/15/2007 8,447 
homaV_0-w 2/15/2007 20,084  m9cy_100 2/15/2007 8,438 
homaV_20-w 2/15/2007 20,024     
homaV_40-w 2/15/2007 20,024     
homaV_50-w 2/15/2007 20,017   Directory Table7.4-2 
homaV_60-w 2/15/2007 20,024  csk7int_dwH 2/15/2007 29,160 
homaV_75-w 2/15/2007 20,024  csk7int_dwHSS 2/15/2007 29,160 
homaV_fl-w 2/15/2007 20,507  csk9int_dd 2/15/2007 29,378 
    csk9int_dw 2/15/2007 29,378 
    csk9int_dwSS 2/15/2007 29,378 
 Directory Table7.3.2-3  csk9int_wd 2/15/2007 29,380 
homV24_0-w 2/15/2007 19,625  csk9int_ww 2/15/2007 29,573 
homV24_20-w 2/15/2007 19,988  csk9int_wwSS 2/15/2007 29,572 
homV24_40-w 2/15/2007 19,988     
homV24_60-w 2/15/2007 19,988     
homV24_75-w 2/15/2007 19,988     
homV24_fll-w 2/15/2007 20,314     
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Fuels Identified for Loading 
in Type 1a Baskets 
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Appendix B 
Fuels Identified for Loading 
in Type 1a Baskets 
The concept of the Type 1a basket developed out of planned loading of Advanced Test Reactor 
(ATR) fuels. The dimensions of the basket compartments lend themselves to many other fuels, not only 
within the aluminum fuel group, but also for several other fuels within the other eight fuel groups 
identified for criticality analysis for the repository. 
The basket design is flexible in terms of being able to vary the basket lengths to deal with longer or 
shorter fuels, and then stacking the baskets to load a canister. The physical incorporation of gadolinium 
poisoning will be constant to the basket compartment plates regardless of the decreased fissile loads for 
these various fuels. 
The selection of ATR as the baseline fuel for loading in the Type 1a basket bounds the total fissile 
in a canister (32.55 kg). This approach also provides a basis for linear loading (78.62 g/cm) in a canister 
which should not be exceeded by any of the other fuels identified for loading in a Type 1a basket. A 
necessary condition for reconfiguring any fuel from existing storage into a disposal canister requires a 
criticality safety evaluation (CSE) prior to loading; this will generate an associated load map. Each CSE 
must evaluate both dry and flooded conditions for the as-loaded fuel, and demonstrate an acceptable 
reactivity that is less than the established subcritical limit. Preferably, the calculated reactivity should be 
shown to be lower than the baseline (ATR) fuel in a comparable configuration. This would allow 
foregoing any other criticality evaluations where the other parameters (total fissile mass, enrichment, 
canister linear loading, physical weight, and thermal output) are also below baseline values.
There is a small number of fuel types identified for installation in Type 1a baskets where at least 
one of the aforementioned parameters is in excess of the ATR fuel. As an example, the CP5 Converter 
Cylinders have a fissile linear loading per fuel assembly that is 106.4% of baseline, and a fissile atom-
density in the fuel element itself that is 499.3% of baseline. Inserting this fuel type into a canister results 
in a total fissile mass of 16.791 kg, or 51.6% of baseline for a fully loaded canister. Similarly, the 
homogenous distribution of the fissile mass throughout the canister produces a calculated fissile atom-
density of only 83.3% of baseline fuel concentrations. However, there are only two pieces of this fuel for 
a total of less than 1.2 kg 235U. Similarly, a fully loaded canister with GA RERTR fuel might have raised 
a concern @ 97.8% of ATR baseline atom-density in a canister were it not there is only one piece of that 
fuel with 381 grams of 235U.
NATIONAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL PROGRAM ENGINEERING DESIGN FILE
EDF-NSNF-068
  Revision 0
   Page 77 of 84
 Title: Criticality Analysis for Proposed Maximum Fuel Loading in a Standardized SNF Canister with Type 
1a Baskets 
Showing the calculated, homogenous distribution of fissile atom-densities in a loaded canister 
allows a relative comparison against the loaded canister with ATR fuel under near equivalent conditions, 
equating to maximum reactivity if the canister were to flood. 
The fuels identified for loading in a Type 1a basket were all listed in the Table B-1 information as 
though there is enough of any one reactor specific fuel to fill a canister. Such is not always the case. 
However, of the calculated fully-loaded canisters, none show a fissile atom-density in the loaded canister 
greater than 50% of ATR baseline values except for the three fuels (MURR, ORR, and MIT) selected for 
these analyses, and the two noted exceptions. This fact is important because the fissile mass for the loaded 
canisters shown in Table B-1 is based on the end-of-life values reported on the DOE 741 forms associated 
with all fuel transfers. Even if 50% burnup were arbitrarily assigned to any of these other fuels, a fully-
loaded canister at double the fissile mass would still have a fissile atom-density within the loaded canister 
that is less than the baseline ATR values. 
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Table B-1 List of DOE fuels identified for disposal in a Type 1a basket configuration. 
Fuel Category: UAlx Fissile/FHU
% of 
baseline
fuel
Fissile/ FHU 
length
% of 
baseline
fuel
SNF can.   
Intrnl. dia.
SNF can. 
Intrnl.
lngth
Basket 
design 
basket(s) / 
canister 
FHUs
per
canister 
(max) 
fissile/canister
% of 
baseline
fuel
Linear 
loading 
% of 
baseline
fuel
Fissile/atom-density Fissile/atom-density 
Fuel Name [Fuel ID #] (g) (%) (g/cm) (%) (cm) (cm) (type) (#) (#) (kg) (%) (g/cm) (%) 
(atom/b-cm) 
[per FHU] 
% of 
baseline fuel
(atom/b-cm) 
[per canister]
% of 
baseline
fuel
Baseline Fuel                  
ATR (w/ poisoned basket) 1085.00 100% 8.62960 100.0% 43.82 414.02 Type 1a-3 3 30 32.550 100% 78.6194 100% 3.989E-04 100% 1.336E-04 100% 
                  
                  
ANLJ [5] 135.969 12.5% 1.0569 12.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-1 1 10 1.360 4.2% 5.3009 6.7% 5.938E-05 14.9% 9.008E-06 6.7% 
ARMF (PLATES) [8] 12.130 1.1% 0.1873 2.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 0.364 1.1% 1.4187 1.8% 3.885E-04 97.4% 2.411E-06 1.8% 
ARMF/CFRMF MARK I [9] 186.036 17.1% 1.8841 21.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 3.721 11.4% 14.5057 18.5% 7.041E-05 17.7% 2.465E-05 18.5%
ARMF/CFRMF MARK I LL [10] 110.000 10.1% 1.1140 12.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.200 6.8% 8.5770 10.9% 4.159E-05 10.4% 1.457E-05 10.9%
ARMF/CFRMF MARK II [11] 135.500 12.5% 1.3723 15.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.710 8.3% 10.5653 13.4% 5.123E-05 12.8% 1.795E-05 13.4%
ARMF/CFRMF MARK III [12] 22.000 2.0% 0.2228 2.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 0.440 1.4% 1.7154 2.2% 8.317E-06 2.1% 2.915E-06 2.2% 
ATR [15] 683.479 63.0% 5.4361 63.0% 43.82 414.02 Type 1a-2 3 30 20.504 63.0% 49.5251 63.0% 2.022E-04 50.7% 8.416E-05 63.0% 
ATR [16] 750.530 69.2% 4.4601 51.7% 43.82 414.02 Type 1a-3 3 30 22.516 69.2% 54.3836 69.2% 1.628E-04 40.8% 9.241E-05 69.2% 
ATSR [17] 149.557 13.8% 2.3187 26.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 4.487 13.8% 17.4920 22.2% 9.520E-05 23.9% 2.972E-05 22.2% 
BNL MEDICAL RX (BMRR) [21] 111.911 10.3% 1.7906 20.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.357 10.3% 13.0890 16.6% 7.882E-05 19.8% 2.224E-05 16.6%
GTRR [87] 161.408 14.9% 2.3108 26.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 4.842 14.9% 18.8781 24.0% 1.118E-04 28.0% 3.208E-05 24.0% 
GENTR [97] 230.284 21.2% 4.5332 52.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-4 4 40 9.211 28.3% 35.9118 45.7% 3.667E-04 91.9% 6.102E-05 45.7% 
JMTR (JAPAN) [123] 217.072 20.0% 2.7134 31.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 4.341 13.3% 16.9257 21.5% 1.171E-04 29.4% 2.876E-05 21.5% 
MIT [135] 346.483 31.9% 5.1962 60.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 10.394 31.9% 40.5244 51.5% 3.566E-04 89.4% 6.886E-05 51.5% 
MIT [136] 308.382 28.4% 4.6248 53.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 9.251 28.4% 36.0681 45.9% 3.174E-04 79.6% 6.129E-05 45.9% 
MURR (COLUMBIA) [142] 593.895 54.7% 7.1944 83.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 24 14.253 43.8% 55.5691 70.7% 2.601E-04 65.2% 9.443E-05 70.7%
MURR (COLUMBIA) [143] 595.016 54.8% 6.8393 79.3% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 24 14.280 43.9% 55.6740 70.8% 2.684E-04 67.3% 9.460E-05 70.8%
UMRR (ROLLA) [146] 186.000 17.1% 2.1379 24.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 3.720 11.4% 14.5029 18.4% 8.279E-05 20.8% 2.464E-05 18.4% 
OHIO STATE [157] 132.483 12.2% 2.0655 23.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.975 12.2% 15.4951 19.7% 9.114E-05 22.9% 2.633E-05 19.7% 
OHIO STATE [158] 172.290 15.9% 1.9380 22.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 3.446 10.6% 13.4339 17.1% 8.552E-05 21.4% 2.283E-05 17.1% 
ORR [165] 260.789 24.0% 4.0558 47.0% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 7.824 24.0% 30.5016 38.8% 1.694E-04 42.5% 5.183E-05 38.8% 
PURDUE UNIVERSITY [177] 16.500 1.5% 0.2014 2.3% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 0.330 1.0% 1.2865 1.6% 4.459E-04 111.8% 2.186E-06 1.6%
PURDUE UNIVERSITY [178] 215.910 19.9% 2.6356 30.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 4.318 13.3% 16.8351 21.4% 1.194E-04 29.9% 2.861E-05 21.4%
RINSC [180] 109.955 10.1% 1.7593 20.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.299 10.1% 12.8603 16.4% 7.763E-05 19.5% 2.185E-05 16.4% 
RINSC [181] 259.611 23.9% 2.5552 29.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 5.192 16.0% 20.2426 25.7% 1.128E-04 28.3% 3.440E-05 25.7% 
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UNIV OF FLORIDA (ARGONAUT) 
[272] 14.707 1.4% 0.2135 2.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 0.441 1.4% 1.7201 2.2% 1.390E-05 3.5% 2.923E-06 2.2% 
UNIV OF FLORIDA (ARGONAUT) 
[273] 14.109 1.3% 0.2048 2.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 0.423 1.3% 1.6502 2.1% 1.334E-05 3.3% 2.804E-06 2.1% 
UNIV OF MASS-LOWELL [274] 122.677 11.3% 1.9319 22.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.680 11.3% 14.3481 18.3% 8.525E-05 21.4% 2.438E-05 18.3%
UNIV OF MASS-LOWELL [275] 68.870 6.3% 1.0846 12.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 2.066 6.3% 8.0550 10.2% 4.786E-05 12.0% 1.369E-05 10.2%
UNIV OF MICHIGAN [276] 93.925 8.7% 1.0749 12.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.879 5.8% 7.3236 9.3% 4.463E-05 11.2% 1.244E-05 9.3% 
UNIV OF MICHIGAN [277] 122.159 11.3% 1.2698 14.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.443 7.5% 9.5250 12.1% 5.273E-05 13.2% 1.619E-05 12.1% 
UNIV OF VIRGINIA [279] 137.895 12.7% 1.5794 18.3% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.758 8.5% 10.7520 13.7% 6.441E-05 16.1% 1.827E-05 13.7%
WORCESTER POLY INSTITUTE 
[287] 173.000 15.9% 2.7244 31.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 5.190 15.9% 20.2339 25.7% 1.390E-04 34.8% 3.438E-05 25.7% 
FRR MTR-C (JAPAN) [289] 85.059 7.8% 0.9666 11.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.701 5.2% 6.6323 8.4% 4.273E-05 10.7% 1.127E-05 8.4% 
FRR TUBES (DENMARK) [298] 77.400 7.1% 1.2384 14.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 2.322 7.1% 9.0526 11.5% 3.808E-05 9.5% 1.538E-05 11.5% 
FRR TUBES (AUSTRALIA) [299] 100.000 9.2% 1.6000 18.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.000 9.2% 11.6959 14.9% 4.920E-05 12.3% 1.987E-05 14.9%
FRR TUBES (AUSTRALIA) [300] 54.049 5.0% 0.8648 10.0% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 1.621 5.0% 6.3215 8.0% 2.659E-05 6.7% 1.074E-05 8.0% 
GRR (GREECE) [440] 114.823 10.6% 1.4759 17.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.445 10.6% 13.4296 17.1% 9.872E-05 24.8% 2.282E-05 17.1% 
SAPHIR (SWITZERLAND) [443] 218.743 20.2% 2.4999 29.0% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 4.375 13.4% 17.0560 21.7% 1.044E-04 26.2% 2.898E-05 21.7%
SAPHIR (SWITZERLAND) [444] 103.504 9.5% 1.1829 13.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.070 6.4% 8.0705 10.3% 4.661E-05 11.7% 1.371E-05 10.3%
JRR-4 (JAPAN) [505] 131.348 12.1% 1.9781 22.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.940 12.1% 15.3624 19.5% 6.599E-05 16.5% 2.610E-05 19.5% 
FRR MTR-S (JAPAN) [506] 165.900 15.3% 1.8852 21.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 3.318 10.2% 12.9357 16.5% 8.334E-05 20.9% 2.198E-05 16.5%
JMTR (JAPAN) [507] 287.000 26.5% 3.2614 37.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 5.740 17.6% 22.3782 28.5% 1.442E-04 36.1% 3.803E-05 28.5% 
FRR MTR-S (JAPAN) [508] 193.200 17.8% 2.1955 25.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 3.864 11.9% 15.0643 19.2% 9.706E-05 24.3% 2.560E-05 19.2%
FRR MTR-C (NETHERLANDS) [509] 63.200 5.8% 0.7182 8.3% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.264 3.9% 4.9279 6.3% 3.175E-05 8.0% 8.374E-06 6.3%
FRR MTR-S (NETHERLANDS) [510] 120.000 11.1% 1.3636 15.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.400 7.4% 9.3567 11.9% 6.029E-05 15.1% 1.590E-05 11.9% 
FRR MTR-C (CANADA) [512] 81.500 7.5% 0.9261 10.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.630 5.0% 6.3548 8.1% 4.094E-05 10.3% 1.080E-05 8.1% 
FRR MTR-S (CANADA) [513] 145.000 13.4% 1.6477 19.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.900 8.9% 11.3060 14.4% 7.284E-05 18.3% 1.921E-05 14.4%
FRR ASTRA (AUSTRIA) [515] 122.500 11.3% 1.4032 16.3% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.450 7.5% 9.5517 12.1% 5.869E-05 14.7% 1.623E-05 12.1%
FRR MTR-C (GERMANY) [517] 52.360 4.8% 0.5950 6.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.047 3.2% 4.0827 5.2% 2.630E-05 6.6% 6.937E-06 5.2% 
FRR MTR-S (GERMANY) [519] 70.840 6.5% 0.8050 9.3% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.417 4.4% 5.5236 7.0% 3.559E-05 8.9% 9.386E-06 7.0% 
FRR MTR-C (SWEDEN) [523] 149.606 13.8% 1.7001 19.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.992 9.2% 11.6652 14.8% 7.516E-05 18.8% 1.982E-05 14.8%
FRR MTR-C2 (TURKEY) [527] 124.000 11.4% 1.4091 16.3% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.480 7.6% 9.6686 12.3% 6.229E-05 15.6% 1.643E-05 12.3%
FRR MTR-S (TURKEY) [528] 168.000 15.5% 1.9091 22.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 3.360 10.3% 13.0994 16.7% 8.440E-05 21.2% 2.226E-05 16.7%
FRR MTR-C (GREECE) [531] 79.950 7.4% 0.9085 10.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.599 4.9% 6.2339 7.9% 4.017E-05 10.1% 1.059E-05 7.9% 
FRR MTR-S (GREECE) [532] 144.300 13.3% 1.6398 19.0% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.886 8.9% 11.2515 14.3% 7.249E-05 18.2% 1.912E-05 14.3%
FRR MTR-C (PORTUGAL) [540] 74.700 6.9% 0.7863 9.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.494 4.6% 5.8246 7.4% 1.077E-04 27.0% 9.897E-06 7.4% 
FRR MTR-O (PORTUGAL) [541] 80.000 7.4% 0.8421 9.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.600 4.9% 6.2378 7.9% 1.230E-04 30.8% 1.060E-05 7.9% 
FRR MTR-S (PORTUGAL) [542] 138.600 12.8% 1.4589 16.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.772 8.5% 10.8070 13.7% 1.065E-04 26.7% 1.836E-05 13.7%
IEA-R1 (BRAZIL) [545] 131.078 12.1% 1.5015 17.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.622 8.1% 10.2205 13.0% 6.099E-05 15.3% 1.737E-05 13.0% 
FRR MTR (ARGENTINA) [547] 123.750 11.4% 1.3026 15.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.475 7.6% 9.6491 12.3% 5.748E-05 14.4% 1.640E-05 12.3%
FRR MTR (JAPAN) [551] 128.982 11.9% 1.3577 15.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.580 7.9% 10.0571 12.8% 1.332E-04 33.4% 1.709E-05 12.8% 
FRR MTR-C (JAPAN) [552] 95.000 8.8% 1.0000 11.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.900 5.8% 7.4074 9.4% 6.944E-05 17.4% 1.259E-05 9.4% 
FRR MTR-S (JAPAN) [553] 147.636 13.6% 1.5541 18.0% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.953 9.1% 11.5116 14.6% 6.828E-05 17.1% 1.956E-05 14.6%
ZPRL (TAIWAN) [554] 121.312 11.2% 1.4582 16.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.426 7.5% 9.4590 12.0% 6.253E-05 15.7% 1.607E-05 12.0% 
FRR MTR (TAIWAN) [555] 300.000 27.6% 3.1579 36.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 6.000 18.4% 23.3918 29.8% 1.392E-04 34.9% 3.975E-05 29.8%
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RU-1 (URAGUAY) [557] 104.480 9.6% 1.2796 14.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.090 6.4% 8.1466 10.4% 5.828E-05 14.6% 1.384E-05 10.4% 
PRR-1 (PHILLIPPINES) [558] 114.902 10.6% 1.1456 13.3% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.298 7.1% 8.9592 11.4% 4.907E-05 12.3% 1.522E-05 11.4%
FRR MTR (VENEZUELA) [559] 101.688 9.4% 1.0704 12.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.034 6.2% 7.9288 10.1% 1.046E-04 26.2% 1.347E-05 10.1%
FRR MTR (JAPAN) [565] 322.677 29.7% 3.3966 39.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 6.454 19.8% 25.1600 32.0% 1.386E-04 34.7% 4.275E-05 32.0%
ASTRA (AUSTRIA) [566] 121.590 11.2% 1.7712 20.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.648 11.2% 14.2211 18.1% 7.398E-05 18.5% 2.417E-05 18.1%
ENEA SALUGGIA (ITALY) [574] 127.725 11.8% 1.9500 22.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.832 11.8% 14.9386 19.0% 8.165E-05 20.5% 2.538E-05 19.0% 
FMRB (GERMANY) [577] 111.339 10.3% 1.1720 13.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.227 6.8% 8.6814 11.0% 2.173E-04 54.5% 1.475E-05 11.0% 
FRR MTR-C (GERMANY) [579] 55.460 5.1% 0.5838 6.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.109 3.4% 4.3244 5.5% 2.576E-05 6.5% 7.348E-06 5.5% 
FRR MTR-S (GERMANY) [582] 113.160 10.4% 1.1912 13.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.263 7.0% 8.8234 11.2% 5.256E-05 13.2% 1.499E-05 11.2%
FRR MTR-S (GERMANY) [584] 122.120 11.3% 1.2855 14.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.442 7.5% 9.5220 12.1% 5.672E-05 14.2% 1.618E-05 12.1%
FRR MTR-S (GERMANY) [585] 79.200 7.3% 0.8337 9.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.584 4.9% 6.1754 7.9% 3.679E-05 9.2% 1.049E-05 7.9% 
FRR MTR-S (GERMANY) [588] 116.480 10.7% 1.2261 14.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.330 7.2% 9.0823 11.6% 5.410E-05 13.6% 1.543E-05 11.6%
IAN-R1 (COLUMBIA) [596] 136.776 12.6% 1.4397 16.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.736 8.4% 10.6648 13.6% 2.103E-04 52.7% 1.812E-05 13.6%
FRR MTR-C (JAPAN) [600] 70.228 6.5% 0.7392 8.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.405 4.3% 5.4759 7.0% 1.080E-04 27.1% 9.305E-06 7.0% 
KURR (JAPAN) [601] 122.201 11.3% 1.5974 18.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.666 11.3% 14.2925 18.2% 6.668E-05 16.7% 2.429E-05 18.2% 
FRR MTR-S (JAPAN) [602] 136.800 12.6% 1.4400 16.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.736 8.4% 10.6667 13.6% 1.054E-04 26.4% 1.813E-05 13.6%
FRR MTR (JAPAN) [605] 284.715 26.2% 2.9970 34.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 5.694 17.5% 22.2000 28.2% 1.385E-04 34.7% 3.772E-05 28.2%
JRR-2 (JAPAN) [606] 130.379 12.0% 1.9635 22.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.911 12.0% 15.2490 19.4% 8.664E-05 21.7% 2.591E-05 19.4% 
FRR MTR-S (NETHERLANDS) [607] 50.000 4.6% 0.5263 6.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.000 3.1% 3.8986 5.0% 6.954E-05 17.4% 6.625E-06 5.0%
FRR MTR-S (NETHERLANDS) [608] 95.000 8.8% 1.0000 11.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.900 5.8% 7.4074 9.4% 6.933E-05 17.4% 1.259E-05 9.4%
FRR MTR (NETHERLANDS) [609] 211.788 19.5% 2.2293 25.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 4.236 13.0% 16.5137 21.0% 1.381E-04 34.6% 2.806E-05 21.0% 
FRR MTR-C (CANADA) [612] 68.200 6.3% 0.7179 8.3% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.364 4.2% 5.3177 6.8% 3.168E-05 7.9% 9.036E-06 6.8% 
MACMASTER (CANADA) [614] 100.211 9.2% 1.4802 17.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.006 9.2% 11.7206 14.9% 6.055E-05 15.2% 1.992E-05 14.9%
FRR MTR (TAIWAN) [628] 126.720 11.7% 1.3339 15.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.534 7.8% 9.8807 12.6% 1.386E-04 34.7% 1.679E-05 12.6% 
THOR (TAIWAN) [629] 102.477 9.4% 1.0214 11.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.050 6.3% 7.9904 10.2% 4.391E-05 11.0% 1.358E-05 10.2% 
FRR MTR-C (PORTUGAL) [631] 88.200 8.1% 0.9284 10.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.764 5.4% 6.8772 8.7% 8.136E-05 20.4% 1.169E-05 8.7% 
FRR MTR-S (PORTUGAL) [632] 158.400 14.6% 1.6674 19.3% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 3.168 9.7% 12.3509 15.7% 8.344E-05 20.9% 2.099E-05 15.7%
TRR-1 (THAILAND) [633] 133.754 12.3% 1.5374 17.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.675 8.2% 10.4292 13.3% 6.471E-05 16.2% 1.772E-05 13.3%
RA-3 (ARGENTINA) [634] 118.399 10.9% 1.3454 15.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.368 7.3% 9.2319 11.7% 5.386E-05 13.5% 1.569E-05 11.7% 
FRR MTR-C (ARGENTINA) [635] 107.800 9.9% 1.1347 13.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.156 6.6% 8.4055 10.7% 5.007E-05 12.6% 1.428E-05 10.7%
RA-3 (ARGENTINA) [636] 119.103 11.0% 1.3534 15.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.382 7.3% 9.2868 11.8% 5.418E-05 13.6% 1.578E-05 11.8% 
PRR-1 (PHILIPPIINES) [638] 144.467 13.3% 1.4341 16.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.889 8.9% 11.2645 14.3% 6.170E-05 15.5% 1.914E-05 14.3%
FRR MTR-O (TURKEY) [642] 85.000 7.8% 0.8947 10.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.700 5.2% 6.6277 8.4% 6.222E-05 15.6% 1.126E-05 8.4% 
FRR MTR-C (TURKEY) [643] 103.500 9.5% 1.0895 12.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.070 6.4% 8.0702 10.3% 6.630E-05 16.6% 1.371E-05 10.3%
FRR MTR-S (TURKEY) [644] 140.000 12.9% 1.4737 17.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.800 8.6% 10.9162 13.9% 6.943E-05 17.4% 1.855E-05 13.9%
ASTRA (AUSTRIA) [646] 88.783 8.2% 1.2933 15.0% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 2.663 8.2% 10.3840 13.2% 5.409E-05 13.6% 1.764E-05 13.2% 
FRR MTR (AUSTRALIA) [649] 248.751 22.9% 2.8267 32.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 4.975 15.3% 19.3958 24.7% 1.250E-04 31.3% 3.296E-05 24.7%
FRR ASTRA (AUSTRIA) [654] 50.000 4.6% 0.5263 6.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.000 3.1% 3.8986 5.0% 2.322E-05 5.8% 6.625E-06 5.0% 
FRR MTR-C1 (SWITZERLAND) [656] 61.280 5.6% 0.6451 7.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.226 3.8% 4.7782 6.1% 4.779E-05 12.0% 8.119E-06 6.1%
FRR MTR-C2 (SWITZERLAND) [657] 74.880 6.9% 0.7882 9.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.498 4.6% 5.8386 7.4% 4.796E-05 12.0% 9.921E-06 7.4%
FRR MTR-S (SWITZERLAND) [658] 87.420 8.1% 0.9202 10.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.748 5.4% 6.8164 8.7% 3.788E-05 9.5% 1.158E-05 8.7%
FRR PIN CLUSTER (CANADA) [663] 207.100 19.1% 0.6768 7.8% 43.82 414.02 Type 1a-1 1 10 2.071 6.4% 5.0022 6.4% 1.844E-04 46.2% 8.500E-06 6.4%
FRR TUBES (GERMANY) [673] 90.000 8.3% 1.4400 16.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 2.700 8.3% 10.5263 13.4% 4.434E-05 11.1% 1.789E-05 13.4%
FRR TUBES (GERMANY) [674] 100.000 9.2% 1.6000 18.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.000 9.2% 11.6959 14.9% 4.927E-05 12.4% 1.987E-05 14.9%
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FRR TUBES (GERMANY) [675] 112.500 10.4% 1.8000 20.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.375 10.4% 13.1579 16.7% 5.543E-05 13.9% 2.236E-05 16.7%
FRR TUBES (DENMARK) [676] 58.310 5.4% 0.9330 10.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 1.749 5.4% 6.8199 8.7% 2.869E-05 7.2% 1.159E-05 8.7% 
FRR TUBES (DENMARK) [678] 73.500 6.8% 1.1760 13.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 2.205 6.8% 8.5965 10.9% 3.616E-05 9.1% 1.461E-05 10.9% 
HIFAR (AUSTRALIA) [680] 94.809 8.7% 1.4856 17.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 2.844 8.7% 11.0888 14.1% 4.695E-05 11.8% 1.884E-05 14.1% 
FRR TUBES (GERMANY) [683] 90.000 8.3% 1.4400 16.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 2.700 8.3% 10.5263 13.4% 4.434E-05 11.1% 1.789E-05 13.4%
FRR TUBES  (AUSTRALIA) [684] 79.900 7.4% 1.2784 14.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 2.397 7.4% 9.3450 11.9% 3.931E-05 9.9% 1.588E-05 11.9%
FRR TUBES (GERMANY) [685] 102.000 9.4% 1.6320 18.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.060 9.4% 11.9298 15.2% 5.026E-05 12.6% 2.027E-05 15.2%
RECH-1 (CHILE) [708] 84.081 7.7% 0.8467 9.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.682 5.2% 6.5560 8.3% 2.851E-04 71.5% 1.114E-05 8.3% 
ASTRA (AUSTRIA) [712] 195.312 18.0% 2.8450 33.0% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 5.859 18.0% 22.8435 29.1% 1.190E-04 29.8% 3.882E-05 29.1%
HOR (NETHERLANDS) [713] 94.194 8.7% 1.0704 12.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.884 5.8% 7.3446 9.3% 4.732E-05 11.9% 1.248E-05 9.3% 
DR-3 (DENMARK) [714] 69.564 6.4% 1.1130 12.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 2.087 6.4% 8.1361 10.3% 4.167E-05 10.4% 1.383E-05 10.3% 
FRR MTR-S (CANADA) [720] 121.520 11.2% 1.2792 14.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.430 7.5% 9.4752 12.1% 5.644E-05 14.2% 1.610E-05 12.1%
FRR ASTRA (AUSTRIA) [738] 313.000 28.8% 3.2947 38.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 6.260 19.2% 24.4055 31.0% 1.454E-04 36.4% 4.147E-05 31.0%
FRG-1 (GERMANY) [741] 184.905 17.0% 1.9464 22.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 3.698 11.4% 14.4175 18.3% 1.830E-04 45.9% 2.450E-05 18.3%
FRG-1 (GERMANY) [742] 96.281 8.9% 1.0135 11.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.926 5.9% 7.5073 9.5% 9.531E-05 23.9% 1.276E-05 9.5% 
JEN-1 (SPAIN) [749] 123.789 11.4% 1.2018 13.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.476 7.6% 9.6522 12.3% 5.153E-05 12.9% 1.640E-05 12.3% 
NEREIDE (FRANCE) [751] 152.483 14.1% 1.7467 20.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 3.050 9.4% 11.8895 15.1% 7.413E-05 18.6% 2.020E-05 15.1%
BER-II [HMI] (GERMANY) [758] 82.971 7.6% 0.9219 10.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.659 5.1% 6.4695 8.2% 3.837E-05 9.6% 1.099E-05 8.2%
DR-3 (DENMARK) [759] 86.969 8.0% 1.3915 16.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 2.609 8.0% 10.1718 12.9% 5.209E-05 13.1% 1.728E-05 12.9% 
ENEA SALUGGIA (ITALY) [760] 130.836 12.1% 1.9975 23.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.925 12.1% 15.3024 19.5% 8.364E-05 21.0% 2.600E-05 19.5% 
ESSOR (ITALY) [762] 390.048 35.9% 2.3639 27.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-1 1 10 3.900 12.0% 15.2066 19.3% 1.093E-04 27.4% 2.584E-05 19.3% 
IOWA ST. UNIV. [792] 147.000 13.5% 2.2511 26.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 4.410 13.5% 17.1930 21.9% 1.087E-04 27.2% 2.922E-05 21.9% 
JEN-1 (SPAIN) [795] 124.038 11.4% 1.2042 14.0% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.481 7.6% 9.6715 12.3% 5.164E-05 12.9% 1.643E-05 12.3% 
R-2 SVTR (SWEDEN) [801] 95.367 8.8% 1.4560 16.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 2.861 8.8% 11.1541 14.2% 6.113E-04 153.3% 1.895E-05 14.2%
IAN-R1 (COLUMBIA) [803] 127.362 11.7% 1.3407 15.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.547 7.8% 9.9308 12.6% 1.958E-04 49.1% 1.687E-05 12.6%
FRM (GERMANY) [805] 139.404 12.8% 1.5968 18.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.788 8.6% 10.8697 13.8% 6.679E-05 16.7% 1.847E-05 13.8% 
FRM (GERMANY) [806] 72.762 6.7% 0.7970 9.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.455 4.5% 5.6735 7.2% 3.333E-05 8.4% 9.641E-06 7.2% 
RV-1 (VENEZUELA) [816] 114.343 10.5% 1.1397 13.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.287 7.0% 8.9156 11.3% 4.887E-05 12.3% 1.515E-05 11.3% 
ATR [843] 621.313 57.3% 4.9416 57.3% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-1 1 10 6.213 19.1% 24.2227 30.8% 1.838E-04 46.1% 4.116E-05 30.8% 
ORR [850] 139.209 12.8% 2.1650 25.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 4.176 12.8% 16.2818 20.7% 9.043E-05 22.7% 2.767E-05 20.7% 
UMRR (ROLLA) [881] 153.610 14.2% 1.7656 20.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 3.072 9.4% 11.9773 15.2% 6.837E-05 17.1% 2.035E-05 15.2% 
JRR-2 (JAPAN) [885] 156.999 14.5% 2.3644 27.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 4.710 14.5% 18.3624 23.4% 7.271E-05 18.2% 3.120E-05 23.4% 
JMTR (JAPAN) [886] 216.942 20.0% 2.7118 31.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 4.339 13.3% 16.9156 21.5% 1.171E-04 29.3% 2.874E-05 21.5% 
FRJ (GERMANY) [933] 37.564 3.5% 0.5963 6.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 1.127 3.5% 4.3935 5.6% 2.239E-05 5.6% 7.466E-06 5.6% 
R-2 SVTR (SWEDEN) [942] 139.438 12.9% 2.1452 24.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 4.183 12.9% 16.3085 20.7% 9.008E-04 225.8% 2.771E-05 20.7%
RPI (PORTUGAL) [943] 122.664 11.3% 1.4049 16.3% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.453 7.5% 9.5645 12.2% 5.790E-05 14.5% 1.625E-05 12.2% 
ORR [944] 238.255 22.0% 2.4461 28.3% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 4.765 14.6% 18.5773 23.6% 9.817E-05 24.6% 3.157E-05 23.6% 
SAPHIR (SWITZERLAND) [945] 121.738 11.2% 1.3913 16.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.435 7.5% 9.4922 12.1% 5.808E-05 14.6% 1.613E-05 12.1%
UNIV OF VIRGINIA [952] 220.367 20.3% 2.5240 29.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 4.407 13.5% 17.1826 21.9% 1.066E-04 26.7% 2.920E-05 21.9%
IOWA ST. UNIV. [953] 158.093 14.6% 2.3709 27.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 4.743 14.6% 18.4904 23.5% 7.816E-05 19.6% 3.142E-05 23.5% 
IEA-R1 (BRAZIL) [954] 102.425 9.4% 1.2266 14.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.049 6.3% 7.9864 10.2% 4.982E-05 12.5% 1.357E-05 10.2% 
MURR (COLUMBIA) [962] 593.895 54.7% 7.1944 83.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 11.878 36.5% 46.3076 58.9% 2.601E-04 65.2% 7.869E-05 58.9%
FRJ TUBES (GERMANY) [999] 116.307 10.7% 1.8461 21.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.489 10.7% 13.6031 17.3% 6.933E-05 17.4% 2.312E-05 17.3%
FRJ (GERMANY) [1000] 106.681 9.8% 1.6934 19.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.200 9.8% 12.4773 15.9% 6.360E-05 15.9% 2.120E-05 15.9% 
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UNIV OF MICHIGAN (CONTROL) 
[1005] 61.681 5.7% 0.6412 7.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.234 3.8% 4.8094 6.1% 2.662E-05 6.7% 8.172E-06 6.1% 
JRR-3M (JAPAN) [1056] 212.061 19.5% 2.6508 30.7% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 4.241 13.0% 16.5350 21.0% 1.170E-04 29.3% 2.810E-05 21.0%
DR-3 (DENMARK) [1059] 82.187 7.6% 1.3150 15.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 2.466 7.6% 9.6125 12.2% 4.923E-05 12.3% 1.633E-05 12.2% 
MNR (CANADA) [1064] 100.211 9.2% 1.4802 17.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.006 9.2% 11.7206 14.9% 6.055E-05 15.2% 1.992E-05 14.9% 
FRR FMRB (GERMANY) [1066] 111.339 10.3% 1.1720 13.6% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.227 6.8% 8.6814 11.0% 2.173E-04 54.5% 1.475E-05 11.0%
FRR MTR-S (GERMANY) [1067] 168.000 15.5% 1.9091 22.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 3.360 10.3% 13.0994 16.7% 8.440E-05 21.2% 2.226E-05 16.7%
FRR MTR-S (GERMANY) [1068] 74.536 6.9% 0.7846 9.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 1.491 4.6% 5.8118 7.4% 3.462E-05 8.7% 9.876E-06 7.4% 
GRR (GREECE) [1069] 114.823 10.6% 1.4759 17.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.445 10.6% 13.4296 17.1% 9.872E-05 24.8% 2.282E-05 17.1% 
JRR-4 (JAPAN) [1070] 131.348 12.1% 1.9781 22.9% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 3.940 12.1% 15.3624 19.5% 6.599E-05 16.5% 2.610E-05 19.5% 
JRR-4 (JAPAN) [1071] 150.086 13.8% 2.2603 26.2% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-3 3 30 4.503 13.8% 17.5539 22.3% 7.540E-05 18.9% 2.983E-05 22.3% 
RU-1 (URAGUAY) [1073] 104.480 9.6% 1.2796 14.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.090 6.4% 8.1466 10.4% 5.828E-05 14.6% 1.384E-05 10.4% 
IEA-R1 (BRAZIL) [1076] 131.078 12.1% 1.5015 17.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-2 2 20 2.622 8.1% 10.2205 13.0% 6.099E-05 15.3% 1.737E-05 13.0%
                    
U metal                   
EBWR ENRICHED HEAVY [64] 713.737 65.8% 4.8448 56.1% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-1 1 10 7.137 21.9% 27.8260 35.4% 1.37E-04 34.3% 4.73E-05 35.4%
HWCTR RMT & SMT [790] 32.603 3.0% 0.1088 1.3% 43.82 414.02 Type 1a-1 1 10 0.326 1.0% 0.7875 1.0% 1.28E-05 3.2% 1.34E-06 1.0% 
HWCTR TWNT [791] 143.923 13.3% 0.4885 5.7% 43.82 414.02 Type 1a-1 1 10 1.439 4.4% 3.4762 4.4% 1.48E-05 3.7% 5.91E-06 4.4% 
HWCTR ETWO [867] 124.791 11.5% 0.4164 4.8% 43.82 414.02 Type 1a-1 1 10 1.248 3.8% 3.0141 3.8% 4.97E-05 12.4% 5.12E-06 3.8% 
EBWR ENRICHED THIN [887] 531.147 49.0% 3.6054 41.8% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-1 1 10 5.311 16.3% 20.7075 26.3% 1.02E-04 25.5% 3.52E-05 26.3%
EBWR NORMAL HEAVY [889] 361.153 33.3% 2.4515 28.4% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-1 1 10 3.612 11.1% 14.0800 17.9% 6.92E-05 17.3% 2.39E-05 17.9%
EBWR NORMAL THIN [890] 286.309 26.4% 1.9434 22.5% 43.82 256.50 Type 1a-1 1 10 2.863 8.8% 11.1621 14.2% 5.48E-05 13.7% 1.90E-05 14.2% 
                   
UZr / UMo                   
CP-5 CONVERTER CYLINDERS [36] 559.695 51.6% 9.181 106.4% 43.82 256.5 Type 1a-3 3 30 16.791 51.6% 65.461 83.3% 1.992E-03 499.3% 1.112E-04 83.3%
HWCTR DRIVER [117] 403.568 37.2% 1.358 15.7% 43.82 414.02 Type 1a-1 1 10 4.036 12.4% 9.748 12.4% 1.299E-04 32.6% 1.656E-05 12.4% 
HWCTR 3EMT-2 [118] 28.595 2.6% 0.248 2.9% 43.82 414.02 Type 1a-2 2 20 0.572 1.8% 1.381 1.8% 2.959E-06 0.7% 2.347E-06 1.8% 
SPEC (ORME) [208] 123.000 11.3% 3.725 43.2% 43.82 256.5 Type 1a-4 4 40 4.920 15.1% 19.181 24.4% 2.466E-04 61.8% 3.259E-05 24.4% 
                
UZrHx                   
GA RERTR [90] 381.44 35.2% 4.031 46.7% 43.82 256.5 Type 1a-2 2 20 7.63 23.4% 29.7373 37.8% 3.26E-04 81.7% 1.31E-04 97.8%
BER-II TRIGA (GERMANY) [236] 192.50 17.7% 2.059 23.9% 43.82 256.5 Type 1a-2 2 20 3.85 11.8% 15.0072 19.1% 8.68E-05 21.8% 6.59E-05 49.4%
                 
HEU oxide                 
HFBR [102] 211.187 19.5% 3.394 39.3% 43.82 256.5 Type 1a-3 3 30 6.336 19.5% 24.700 31% 1.457E-04 36.5% 4.197E-05 31.4% 
ORR [461] 152.765 14.1% 2.217 25.7% 43.82 256.5 Type 1a-3 3 30 4.583 14.1% 17.867 23% 9.260E-05 23.2% 3.036E-05 22.7% 
HFBR [706] 216.786 20.0% 3.480 40.3% 43.82 256.5 Type 1a-3 3 30 6.504 20.0% 25.355 32% 1.767E-04 44.3% 4.309E-05 32.3% 
ORR [753] 44.725 4.1% 0.696 8.1% 43.82 256.5 Type 1a-3 3 30 1.342 4.1% 5.231 7% 2.883E-05 7.2% 8.889E-06 6.7% 
ORR [903] 176.838 16.3% 2.750 31.9% 43.82 256.5 Type 1a-3 3 30 5.305 16.3% 20.683 26.3% 1.151E-04 28.9% 3.515E-05 26.3% 
GCRE (1Z SERIES) [916] 315.764 29.1% 3.965 46.0% 43.82 256.5 Type 1a-3 3 30 9.473 29.1% 36.931 47.0% 4.143E-04 103.9% 6.276E-05 47.0%
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HFBR [961] 211.19 19.5% 3.394 39.3% 43.82 256.5 Type 1a-3 3 30 6.336 19.5% 24.700 31.4% 1.457E-04 36.5% 4.197E-05 31.4% 
ASTRA (AUSTRIA) [1058] 144.05 13.3% 2.098 24.3% 43.82 256.5 Type 1a-3 3 30 4.322 13.3% 16.848 21.4% 8.776E-05 22.0% 2.863E-05 21.4% 
                
U/Th oxide                
ERR [68] 1059.71 97.7% 6.570 76.1% 43.82 256.5 Type 1a-1 1 10 10.597 32.6% 41.3141 52.5% 1.30E-03 326.7% 7.02E-06 5.3%
                 
Th-U carbide                 
PEACH BOTTOM UNIT I CORE I 
[169] 253.00 23.3% 0.6917 8.0% 43.815 414.02 Type 1a-1 1 10 2.530 7.8% 6.1108 7.8% 2.786E-05 7.0% 1.045E-05 7.8% 
PEACH BOTTOM UNIT I CORE I 
[170] 218.05 20.1% 0.5962 6.9% 43.815 414.02 Type 1a-1 1 10 2.180 6.7% 5.2666 6.7% 2.401E-05 6.0% 9.005E-06 6.7% 
PEACH BOTTOM UNIT I CORE II 
[171] 117.14 10.8% 0.3660 4.2% 43.815 414.02 Type 1a-1 1 10 1.171 3.6% 2.8292 3.6% 1.511E-05 3.8% 4.837E-06 3.6% 
PEACH BOTTOM UNIT I CORE II 
(INTACT) [206] 103.39 9.5% 0.3230 3.7% 43.815 414.02 Type 1a-1 1 10 1.034 3.2% 2.4971 3.2% 1.333E-05 3.3% 4.269E-06 3.2% 
                 
LEU oxide                 
HWCTR SPRO [115] 17.67 1.6% 0.3710 4.3% 43.815 256.5 Type 1a-4 4 40 0.706868 2.2% 2.756 3.5% 4.391E-05 11.0% 2.919E-06 2.2% 
HWCTR SOT [120] 20.91 1.9% 0.6097 7.1% 43.815 256.5 Type 1a-4 4 40 0.836212 2.6% 3.260 4.1% 7.216E-05 18.1% 3.453E-06 2.6% 
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